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ABSTRACT
This thesis takes the position that decentralization is a dynamic process in con-
stant transition in Third World countries between centralization and decentraliza-
tion. The author uses an historic approach to explore the process of decentralization
as it affects local governments, particularly historic-cultural influences which have
had a negative impact on the development of local government institutions. Among
these the author includes an in-depth discussion of the influence of the British and
French models of colonial administration. Examination is made of the evolution
of decentralization terminology from the 1960's to the 1980's which shows a loos-
ening up of the traditional definitions and the emergence of new 'mixed' forms of
decentralization that integrate aspects of power transfer with central control. A
typology of different types of decentralization gives some dimension to the mod-
ern decentralization process. To provide a better empirical understanding of the
trends in decentralization reform, two case studies from the continent of Africa are
presented. The first is on the Anglophone country of Zambia which is undergo-
ing a strong re-centralization despite its long-lived decentralization rhetoric. The
second case study is on the Francophone country of Morocco where an interesting
experiment in tutorial decentralization is underway.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Associate Professor, Economics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The decentralization debate has been going on for several decades in the Third
World. It started in the 50's and 60's with newly independent nations debating
appropriate administrative form to suit the primary task of national unification.
The debate has reemerged in the Third World in the 1980's for different reasons
and in an entirely different political and economic context.
First of all, many Third World nations, emerging from the inhibiting insecuri-
ties of the infancy stage of nationhood, are facing a critical problem of rapid urban
growth for which they are politically and institutionally ill-prepared. Furthermore,
this condition coincides with economic recession and diminishing national resources
available for development. Given this predicament, countries are spurred by both
internal and external forces to redefine the policy and organizational structure by
which they manage their development process. In particular, in the face of escalat-
ing demand, they are challenged to find more efficient solutions to the delivery and
operation of urban services and to the internal generation, allocation and manage-
ment of available resources. For many, this 'reorganization' or 'reorientation' falls
7
under the broad and vaguely-defined umbrella term, decentralization.
While most Third World nations have intellectually accepted the notion of de-
centralization in some form as an essential condition for political, economic and so-
cial development, they have been unprepared to referee the ensuing political debate
over institutional reform and, in many cases, have either been unable or unwilling
to take on the costly burden of long-neglected institutional development at the local
level. More to the point, political elites at the center have fought to retain their
power and political elite at the local level who are generally well-networked with
central government authorities and may even have been paid to remain loyal to the
center have been reluctant to disturb the status quo for fear of losing the influ-
ence and benefits of their position. Despite the struggle, policies of decentralization
have appeared in the planning documents and presidential speeches of developing
countries around the world and some significant experiments with decentralization
theory have been undertaken.
There are a considerable number of politically and financially influential devel-
opment organizations including the United Nations, the World Bank, the OECD
and the U.S. Agency For International Development, which are advocating 'de-
centralization' as a major policy direction and program goal, largely based on the
experience of the developed countries. Their intervention in the development pro-
cess of Third World nations at the policy and program levels has influenced the
decentralization experiences of Third World countries (and will continue to do so)
though the degree to which their interventions have been constructive is still under
evaluation.
I plan to explore, academically, major historic influences on the formation of
modern local government in Third World countries. I will trace changes in the
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lexicon of decentralization theory and use modern definitions to create a typolog-
ical framework of decentralization policy. Finally, in the context of the foregoing,
I will examine the transitional experiments of several countries with decentraliza-
tion policy over the last three decades. In this examination I will try to make
some distinction among the various types of decentralization policy these experi-
ences represent and identify trends which could have implications for the nature of
future external donor assistance to these countries. Like Cohen, I see the political
importance of decentralization as "a process, not a condition," one which is long-
term and not necessarily flowing along a continuum from unity to diversity.[Cohen,
p.17] I use the descriptor 'transitional' intentionally because countries often tran-
sition from one form of decentralization to another over time or may experience
some forms such as privatisation simultaneously with others. In this exploration, I
would also hope to identify those factors influencing the transition from one form of
decentralization to another. As fiscal decentralization is becoming an increasingly
important feature of the decentralization debate, I will attempt to highlight the
fiscal reforms which in some respects may be the key indicators of transition.
The base of decentralization literature was established in the 1960's by [Hicks],
the [United Nations, 1962] and [Maddick]. An initial round of institutional ex-
plorations to modernize the decentralization literature of the 1960's was launched
in 1981. It primarily included a research program by the United Nations Devel-
opment Administration Division with an international seminar in Khartoum in
September 1981 [United Nations,1981]; a decentralized planning study by the In-
ternational Labor Organization [ILO]; a United States Agency For International
Development-funded research program at the Institute of International Studies, Uni-
versity of California [Institute of International Studies]; and a major Asia-focussed
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research program established by the United Nations Centre for Regional Devel-
opment in Nagoya, Japan, the preliminary results of which were reported at a
seminar held there in July 1981 [UNCRD, 1982]. Third World authors made sig-
nificant contributions to the research initiatives just mentioned above. I have
found only one recent Third World-initiated research program on the subject of
decentralization, an Asia-focussed intiative by the Bangladesh Academy for Rural
Development. [Bangladesh Academy]
Similar research efforts continue today but with increasing emphasis on fiscal
characteristics and implications of decentralization. Individual authors including
Kochen, Rondinelli, Davey, Mawhood, Nellis, Conyers, Rowat(ed.) and Tordoff
have made considerable contributions during the 1980's to the literature on decen-
tralization in the Third World. Others, including Bahl, Schroeder, and Bird have
focused on fiscal implications of decentralization.
The structure of this thesis will include: in Chapter 2, a discussion of historic
cultural influences and the impact of French and English colonial models on local
government development; in Chapter 3, a review of the evolution of definitions
of decentralization and the elaboration of a typology of current observed forms of
decentralization in the Third World; and in Chapter 4, a presentation of selected
country briefs which exemplify major experiments in decentralization and illustrate
the dynamism of the decentralization process as well as the hybrid nature of the
structural forms themselves.
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Chapter 2
The Impact Of Historic Cultural
Influences And European Colonial
Models On The Evolution Of
Modern Local Government
It has often been said that only a study of history can give us a clear understanding
of the present and of how to build effective tools for the future. We are all too often
inclined to depend on the trends of our own generation and milieu to explain how
things work and to guide the actions necessary to make them work better. This
inclination may lead to serious misunderstandings of problems and inappropriate
efforts to improve or replace present systems. V. Subramaniam in Rowat's Inter-
national Handbook on Local Government Reorganization [p.591] criticized scholars
of local government in the Third World for using inappropriate Western models
as comparisons and focussing too closely on the local and immediate factors ef-
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fecting the shape of local government rather than looking to the historic-cultural
environment which has influenced its evolution both pre and post-independence.
He said:
"Local government in developing countries has been judged too long
by artificial standards derived from exceptional developments in nine-
teenth and twentieth century Britain, Puritan New England, the ex-
panding United States and the free cities of Europe. It is time that its
'limited' development in the new nations is set against the similar his-
tory of Western Europe, particularly France, and against the historical
compulsions of colonialism, nationalism and economic development."
Bearing in mind this criticism, it seems appropriate to devote this chapter to
background information which will serve as an essential historical foundation for
the chapters that follow. First, I will discuss three important cultural influences
affecting attitudes toward local government, these being religion, 'adoptive' Western
education, and elitism including presidentialism. Secondly, I will outline the features
of the two major European local government models (British and French) which
provided the legacy on which the 'modern era' structure of local government and
central-local governmental relationships for many Third World nations are based.
2.1 Historic Cultural Influences
For Third World countries undertaking public administrative reforms, there are
important historic cultural influences affecting the 'implementation' form which
decentralization policy may take within a society and more particularly the pace
of implementation. I have chosen to review three areas of influence which I believe
have caused a significant negative bias in local attitudes toward local government
reforms: 1) the influence of religion, particularly the philosophy of Islam, 2) the
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influence of Western education which was introduced with the colonialist regimes,
and 3) the influence of dominating elites and heads of state. The strong grip of
Islam in many countries inhibited the development of local government institutions.
Islamic tenets may be seen as the cause of unsuccessful or slow implementation of
decentralization policy in the Islamic countries. The Western educational influence
biased local political leaders toward centralized structures of government in the
image of the Western colonialists. It fostered attitudes of the inferiority of local
institutions and the inability of local populations and rural elite to assume self-
governing responsibilities. Finally, small groups of elites, responsible only to all-
powerful heads of state, emerged in many countries to construct a national unity
during the colonial and post-colonial era. In many instances, these elites evolved
into 'centralists' dedicated more to self-enrichment and perpetuation of their own
power and influence than to the well-being of the general populus they represented.
2.1.1 The Influence of Religion
Down through the centuries, the Church of Western Europe, particularly the Ca-
tholic church, established a model in Third World countries of a highly centralized
and powerful bureaucracy that was typically aligned with or an agent of the foreign
colonizing powers. Until the recent (1960's) revolutionary theology emerged in Latin
America, the Church made no strong effort to promote local institutionalization of
power. Therefore, when we think of the historic role of the Western European
Church in the developing countries, it can best be seen as one of reinforcing at the
local level the will of the centralized administrative bureaucracy.
A religious influence of greater consequence for the evolution of local government
institutions in a significant number of countries in the Third World is that of Islam.
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Centuries of Islamic control and the Koranic code preceded later colonial influences.
I would argue that in countries where Islam has historically been the predominant
religion, the Koranic code may be far more significant in slowing or obstructing the
progress of decentralization policy than the centralized administrative bureaucracies
inherited from colonizers of Western Europe. Interestingly, the recent resurgence of
Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia has not to my
knowledge been studied in terms of its influence on local government institutions.
To begin with, it is useful to establish the basic relationships in Islamic theology
which framework would influence the manner in which institutions, particularly at
subnational or local levels, may be viewed. Bruno Etienne, an authority on North
Africa and in particular Algerian history, describes the Islamic religion as a vehicle
for total control of the individual "which favors a type of unanimous concensus"
which can only be achieved through central control with no intermediaries.[Etienne,
p.29] The Islamic theology tolerates no intermediaries between the individual and
his God and this code is carried over into an ideal social order which places morally
legitimate leadership at the top or center with no interference from processes or
institutions which would cause separation of powers or checks and balances within
the system and thus obscure the relationship of guidance and control between the
center and the individual.[Nellis, 19831
Historically, Islam has been instrumental in preventing the development of mu-
nicipal institutions. If we go far back in history, Jones in his standard work on the
cities of antiquity, The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian[Oxford,1940] docu-
ments Greek and Roman cities with a high degree of internal autonomy in the 2nd
C. These civic institutions and local government authorities decayed steadily down
through the centuries at the hands of the increasingly crushing central bureacracy
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of the Imperial government and the Roman Church. Quoting from Jones:
"....[Cities] had been in the past very useful institutions-they had
collected the taxes, maintained public security, built the roads and per-
formed countless other functions for the Imperial government-and if
they could retain sufficient vigor to perform these tasks, so much the
better. Despite the efforts of the Imperial government, the growth of the
bureaucracy absorbed more and more the strength of the cities during
the fourth and succeeding centuries." [Jones, p.86]
By the time of the Muslim conquests of the Roman Empire, there was little
left of juridical, political municipal institutions to inherit. Inheriting no municipal
institutions, the Islamic society did not seek to create any. Instead, it perpetuated
a centralized bureaucratic administration which had been the trend toward the end
of Antiquity and perfectly suited the juridical structures of Islam. Any attempts
toward municipal independence were quickly put down within the Islamic territorial
empire and never went so far as to establish municipal institutions. As Hourani and
Stern point out, the persistant absence of municipal institutions in Islamic countries
is matched by "the absence of corporative institutions in general in Islamic society."
[Hourani and Stern, p.36]
An interesting almost paradoxical contrast can be made between the develop-
ment of the Islamic cities west of the Indian sub-continent including Africa and those
cities of Western Europe. The Islamic society through the Arab conquests took over
"an incomparably more advanced urban life than Western Europe" with scarcely
any disturbance to existing urban patterns yet "no corporate civic institutions ever
developed within the framework of Islamic civilization" because it was anathema to
the structure of Islam. On the other hand, the Latin-Germanic West which became
Western Europe lost the Greco-Roman legacy of municipal organizations during
the Feudal period and much of its urban towns network even disappeared. Yet
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surprisingly, with no apparent foundation, when Western Europe emerged from the
Dark Ages in the Eleventh Century, it experienced a widespread communal move-
ment and "an astonishing efflorescence of corporative municipal institutions" lead-
ing to the growth of innumerable cities with internal autonomy. [Hourani andStern ,
p.32-33] Subramaniam attributes this quest for structures of self-governance to the
example set during the Feudal era by powerful commercial and craft elites who "se-
cured the 'freedom' and self-government of several prosperous [European] cities."
[Subramaniam, 1980, p. 590] This seems a dubious foundation on which to rest a
continental phenomenon.
By the Eighteenth century, the Koranic or Moslem law was culturally so deeply
rooted in far-flung Third World countries that the Western European colonialists
of the 18th to 20th centuries were quickly defeated in their efforts to supplant
Islamic controls and custom. Even the French with their rigorously enforced policy
of 'assimilation' were obliged to allow indigenous populations of their colonies to
continue to be ruled by Koranic law overlaid by French law and administration. As
Cowan notes on the subject of French rule in Algeria, ".... agitation resulting from
the failure to recognize the existence of Moslem law [was] threatening the very basis
of French control." [Cowan, p.39]
Coming back to my original thesis, those countries which historically became
part of the Islamic territorial empire and were later subjected to colonial domination
(especially French) have experienced centuries of centralized bureaucratic rule and
can retain no historic memory of truly decentralized local government institutional
structures. Furthermore, their peoples have lived for generations by the Islamic
social codes which make Western notions of organizing local groups to achieve a
degree of institutional or corporate autonomy from central control incomprehensible
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and, for the more fundamentalist, perhaps even blasphemous.
The case of the Central Tunisia Development Project CTDP, financed and
technically-assisted by USAID in 1979 is a good recent example of a cultural conflict.
The CTDP was designed as the first independent regional development authority in
Tunisia to promote localized development efforts, locally planned and controlled. It
was legally empowered to undertake regional planning activities without all the tra-
ditional back and forth between local and central government. While the Tunisian
Government cooperated in the design as a progressive intellectual exercise, this co-
operation broke down in implementation. The operation failed at both local and
central levels. First it failed because local councilors "find it 'unthinkable' that they
can do anything but implement central directives... [They] are prevented by culture,
custom and self-interest from undertaking the roles allowed by [new administrative]
law." [Nellis, 1983, p.162] Secondly, it failed because the implementation approach
was rejected by central government officials who described it to be "an inappropriate
American-inspired idea... completely alien to Tunisian sensibilities." [Nellis, 1983,
p.165] While decentralization policy has been promoted in any number of Islamic
countries and is intellectually accepted as a progressive approach to development
management, it is this history of ingrained cultural attitudes shaped by Islam which
makes such policy difficult if not impossible to implement.
2.1.2 The Influence of Western Education
While the British and the French followed different approaches in their governance
of their colonies, both systems placed considerable importance on the value to the
colonized of a Western education. Both British and French policy established a
network of schools in the colonies based on their respective national educational
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systems and facilitated through extensive scholarship programs the higher school
and university education of thousands of promising young Third World nationals
in French and British boarding schools and universities.
This process of education served to create a generation of educated elite in
the developing countries who identified more strongly with European culture and
philosophies than with their own. The experience was more dramatic for the franco-
phone populations who were the object of intensive assimilation policy to make them
into 'frenchmen'. In the British colonies, the educated elite adopted the country-
wide orientation of the British centralized bureacracy. They also developed a great
suspicion of local self-government as a political vehicle of the British Colonial Office
to undermine national independence movements and later as a threat to national
integration. In the French colonies where the educated elite as 'assimiles' had fully
embraced the French cultural identity, they sought exact replication of the French
way of doing things. According to Subramaniam, in the former French colonies,
"centralist tendencies were not conceived as retaliatory safeguards against a cen-
tralizing colonial administration" as in the British colonies; "but rather as necessary
replications of French centralism itself." [Subramaniam, 1980, p.587]
Many among the educated elite either rejected or at least lost touch with their
own cultures. Those who tried to reestablish their cultural identity found them-
selves somewhere between the two, what has been termed a third culture identity.
For both Anglophone and Francophone intellectuals, centralist tendencies became
ingrained in their understanding of the appropriate institutions for public admin-
istration and political control in their homelands and thus became the thrust of
the post-independence governments led by these elites. The damage for the local
government movement was that these Western-educated elite had lost faith in tra-
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ditional institutions; and so, devoted themselves instead to recreating or reinforcing
the mother country institutional models which had been exported to and, under
English policy, conceived for the colonies.
There was one most articulate plea to the French Overseas Administration in
1942 to preserve local native institutions in the colonies as an essential foundation to
the development of a modern society. [The village council and chieftancy structure
would have been the logical forerunner to modern local government.] This plea was
made by the Governor General of Sudan, Felix Eboue, himself a Guianan turned
frenchman. Quoting from Eboue:
"By administering against the chiefs, we will end up by compromising
the institution of the chief to the point of being obliged to administer
more and more directly. The African official left alone in the bush, has
only the fear of prison as a brake on his action, and temptation is often
so strong that the brake no longer works. The chief, on the other hand,
is restrained by custom, by invisible sanctions and by the feeling that he
is the master of his people... A chief may administer his people badly,
but it is rare that he is blind enough to destroy them." [Eboud, p.582]
Interestingly, Ebou4 foresaw the importance of popularly recognized lo cal au-
thority and institutions as an essential vehicle to ensure local accountability and
local participation in governance and development. These issues have come back to
the forefront of national policy discussions in developing countries in recent years
and are at the heart of the decentralization policy dialog. Unfortunately, Ebou4's
pleas fell on the deaf ears of the indigenous educated elite, rigidly converted to and
convinced of the superiority of the mother country institutions and the French Over-
seas Administration whose "conviction [was that] the institutions of Africa [were]
not worth preserving and developing and that the boon of French civilization should
be bestowed [in full] on the native population." [Buell, p.987]
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2.1.3 The Influence of Elitism and Presidentialism
Elitism is defined here as the political, economic and social dominance of a minor-
ity group over the majority, usually operating hand-in-hand with an all-powerful
leader. In pre-colonial Africa, the authority of the office of the chief was unsur-
passed and its power reinforced by a chief-designated ruling elite. In practice,
however, (as confirmed in the earlier quote from Eboue) centuries of custom and
spiritual tradition guided the designation of the powerful and the exercise of power,
ensuring some measure of responsible and accountable leadership. Under colonial
regimes, both English and French, the notion of elitism was reinforced and, in fact,
became a tool of the administration for political control. The French created a
highly-selective hierarchy of 'assimilated' civil servants who quickly perceived the
possibilities of self-serving opportunities in a system which narrowly structured ac-
countability only to the next immediate superior. The British also established an
elite civil service corp and went even further to select a ruling class of bureaucrats
based on ethnic or tribal origins (e.g. Ibo of Nigeria, Kikuyu of Kenya) and British
educational background. Quick captures the sense of separation of the ruling elite
from their own people in his study of post-colonial Zambia:
"The elite status [of bureaucrats] in the colonial system separated
them from the rest of society and encouraged attitudes of superior-
ity over illiterate 'bush' Africans. After Independence... young, well-
educated public servants generally dislike-or even fear-working closely
with the rural population; and this leads to the kind of formalism,
distance, and avoidance in the relationship between bureaucrats and
clients." [Quick, p.391]
The most damaging consequence of the colonial era with respect to elitism was
the destruction of a viable system of accountability. The office of the chief was
either destroyed or subsumed into the colonial administration and the honorary
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positions of the ruling elite became appointed positions of the State often obtained
through graft. The close relationship between the rulers and the ruled which had
existed in village systems was eliminated. The traditional leadership structure was
thus cut off from a system of accountability which had evolved through centuries of
carefully preserved cultural and ethical values and practices and was grafted into
the impersonal, abstract notion of the State where the individual was able to escape
or ignore traditional value -systems.
The elimination of traditional forms of leadership selection and accountability
and the subsequent models of highly centralized authoritarian rule by the colonial
regimes set the example for the post-Independence emergence of presidentialism or
the tendency to invest all powers in the head of state with no provision to protect
against an inappropriate use of these powers. Writing about ex-British colonies,
Nwabueze observed:
"The President is the government. His responsibility for it is entire
and undivided. The executive power is vested in him alone, and in the
exercise of it he is bound by no one's advice. With him too lies the
ultimate responsibility for policy." [Nwabueze, p.175]
This trend toward presidentialism, particularly in the African Countries, has
resulted in unstable administrations structured to the personality and changeable
preferences of the head of state. Frequent presidential abuse of power and interfer-
ence in the activities of all levels of government have reinforced a pattern of hier-
archal authority focused on the president. This form of centralism in the extreme
has created an atmosphere of insecurity among government officials, discouraging
independent decision-making and initiative, and also undermining the development
of rational systems of administration and control which might have facilitated an
earlier development of local government institutional capacity and popular initia-
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tive.
2.2 Colonial Models Of Local Government
The reason for my focus on the British and French colonial models of government is
that these nations collectively have at some time controlled the affairs and helped
shape the structure of the majority of today's sovereign Third World nations. The
ultimate goal of both France and Britain in their colonial empires was to establish
a successful administrative structure to control vast undeveloped territories with
enormous diversity of peoples, languages, customs and geography.
These two European powers advocated very different political philosophies to
determine the structure of their colonial administrative systems and, in particular,
the place, if any, of self government or independent local governments within these
systems. The fundamental policy principle guiding British operations in its colonies
was 'indirect rule' which Cameron defines as "rule by the Governor of the territory
through the agency of existing traditional authorities." [Cameron and Cooper, p.14]
In contrast, the policy principle guiding the French was that of "assimilation" oth-
erwise termed 'direct rule'; and defined by Cowan as "the imposition on colonial
peoples of the culture, language and political institutions of France through a pro-
cess of education and example." [Cowan, p.37] Structurally, the two models resulted
for the British in a full-scale conciliar form of government down to the level of the
'bush' village; and, for the French, in popular representation permitted only down
to the level of the territorial assembly, akin to a regional legislature. In both cases,
local representation was largely bought or appointed so as to ensure conformance
with the colonial government's position.
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Despite the theoretical and structural differences in their respective approaches,
operationally the systems remained heavily centralized. The consequent impact
on the colonized was the same in two major respects: 1) traditional institutions
were destroyed [French] or reformed [English] out of existence; and 2) the indige-
nous leadership cadre were indirectly [English, especially through the educational
and civil service systems] or directly [French, through policies of assimilation and
association] co-opted to the European way of thinking, both culturally and politi-
cally. These factors have had critical negative consequences for the development of
a strong, modern and independent local government structure.
2.2.1 The British Model
Despite the popular image of the British local government system as a model of
decentralization, in the 19th C, it took an overseas form of strong administra-
tive centralization in British-ruled South Asia (India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaysia
and Ceylon(Sri Lanka) and Malaysia) and the Himalayan kingdoms (Nepal and
Bhutan). Local government systems pre-dated colonial rule in Asia as illustrated
by India where there existed a network of traditional rural local governments called
panchayats. As Khanna and Bhatnagarere describe British rule in 19th C In-
dia, "they [the British] built up an increasingly centralized administrative system
which proved inimical to the vigorous functioning of the village panchayats, with
the result that they gradually ceased to exist in the length and breadth of the
country." [Khanna and Bhatnagar, p.426] The ultimate goal of the British in Asia
was to create a unitary rule. The hierarchy established included a system of States
subdivided into Districts. The major figures in the management structure were the
District Collectors (indigenous but British-trained administrators) in whom were
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concentrated all the executive, judicial, taxing and other powers. This was a simple
administrative deconcentration of powers but with no ultimate decision-making au-
thority. These district administrators had a reinforcing effect on central authority
because of similar background and ethnic origins. Subramaniam's description sums
up the importance of this system of bureaucrats: "The District Collector or his
equivalent was the common denominator of all British administration in the empire
and he dominated or debilitated all other institutions." [Subramaniam, 1980, p.584]
Local government bodies, the panchayati rajs, were (re)introduced by the British
in the early 1900's in their Asia empire not to replace but to supplement district
government. But, until after independence of South Asia from British rule in the
1940's, the local government form had no great popularity because it was seen as a
political mechanism to divide centralized national independence movements. The
Balvantray Mehta Committee Report issued in 1957 structured an institutional
framework for democratic decentralization in Independent India. It proposed a
three-tier hierarchal system consisting of:
1. panchayats, a directly elected institution at the base or village level,
2. panchayat samitis, a mixed institution of elected and co-opted members at
the intermediate level covering a development block which grouped several
panchayats and
3. zila parashad at the District level, representing mainly centrally-appointed
staff, and charged with coordinating all the panchayat samitis in a District.
Functionally, the panchayat was to be responsible for civic amenities such as water
supply, sanitation, maintenance of public streets, drains, tanks, lighting of village
streets, land management, records management relating to cattle, disaster relief,
maintenance of panchayat roads, culverts, bridges, drains, supervision of primary
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schools, welfare of underprivileged classes, collection and maintenance of statistics.
The primary function of the next local government level, the panchayat samiti,
was to coordinate all development activities for the block and its panchayats, manag-
ing the expenditure of most central and state development funds. The zila parishads
supervised all activities of the panchayats samiti, approved their budgets and con-
trolled the district-wide allocation of funds for central and state governments. Fi-
nancial resources of the two bottom tiers, the panchayats and the panchayat samiti
were designated as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Sources of Local Government Revenues, India, circa 1957
Panchayat Panchayat Samiti
i) 3/4 share of net land revenue realized i) share of land revenue in block
ii) property or house tax ii) cess on land revenue
iii) tax on markets iii) tax on professions
iv) tax on transport vehicles iv) surcharge of duty on transfer of property
v) octroi or terminal tax v) net proceeds tolls/leases
vi) conservancy rate vi) pilgrim tax
vii) water rate vii) primary education cess
viii) lighting rate viii) proceeds from fairs
ix) income from cattle ponds ix) share of motor vehicle tax
x) slaughterhouse fees x) voluntary public gifts
xi) grants from panchayats samiti xi) government grants
Source: Narain, Iqbal in Panchayati Raj p.21-22
While the new panchayati raj bodies did legally receive a delegation of admin-
istrative and financial powers and were to function as representative bodies with
regular elections, in operation, they stimulated little local participation, they re-
mained poor, due in part to a reluctance to levy local taxes and ultimately they
became "mere executive agencies of the state governments." [Singhvi, p.143] Accord-
ing to Zink et al who studied the evolution of rural local government in India, "the
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tradition of centralism in the country makes the local body [panchayati raj]more
a kind of administrative agent of the state government, subject to the same condi-
tions of discipline as its paid employees, rather than a Government authority with
some exclusive jurisdiction or initiative of its own." [Zink et al, p.81] This is not a
surprising result as in practice there was no real devolution of power in thesystem,
rather it was a decentralized administrative hierarchy between the state and village
level.
In Africa, a similar British model of centralized rule was introduced at the turn
of the century (circa 1900) but following a different approach defined above as 'in-
direct rule.' Some authors have attributed the system of Native Administration or
Native Authority which emerged in Africa to a strategic decision by the British to
establish control at the grassroots level in direct reaction against the loss of control
in Asia to the middle class educated elites who were able to rally the masses against
the British administration. Wraith argues, I think more realistically, that the deci-
sion to adopt indirect rule was the result of political and economic conditions faced
locally in Africa. British administrators in Africa were confronted with powerful
and diverse traditional institutions which would be difficult to dismantle without a
considerable military and civilian force. Since the British did not have the financial
resources or the personnel to establish a full-fledged system of direct administra-
tion in its African Empire, they chose to supplement the British Colonial Office
resources by using the existing structure of traditional authority to the service of
the Government.[Wraith, 1953]
Quite different from the French model, the British overseas administration at
the local level had no uniformity. This was because there was enormous variety
among traditional institutions, especially in West Africa, and the British political
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structure constructed around these institutions, per force, reflected their diversity.
The marriage was uncomfortable from the beginning because of the fundamental
clash between traditional authorities which were social institutions based on cen-
turies of custom and ceremony and the institutions of British public administration
based on Western logic and management principles.
The effect of indirect rule in practice was to divide the allegiences of the tra-
ditional elite, the chiefs, by delegating to them certain powers of administrative
representation on behalf of the British-controlled central government which powers
separated them from a direct accountability to the traditional 'democratic' sys-
tem of independent village councils and tied them, often with generous financial
bonuses, to centralized British administration. It was not uncommon practice for
the British Administration to replace recalcitrant chiefs with those of their own
choice who had no credability among the local people, having been selected outside
of the traditional process of selection.
The operations of traditional authorities were subjected to close supervision and
regular interference by the District Officer or Commissioner, ostensibly in an effort
to alter local practices so as to build local institutions according to the British pub-
lic administration model. The main functions of 'native authorities' were typically
restricted to maintaining public order, keeping demographic statistics and collect-
ing central government taxes. Their access to revenues was even more limited, the
major source being a small proportion, fixed by the Direct Taxation Ordinance,
of the direct taxes they collected on behalf of central government. In many cases,
the revenues received were too small to maintain and equip even a marginally com-
petent staff. The British Resident or District Officer had the authority to direct
native authorities to issue any regulation he desired and if refused could issue the
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law himself. Where traditional authorities were weak and seemingly incapable of
managing administrative functions, the District Officer would take over most of the
operations and would sideline the functions of the Native Authorities to matters
of custom and ceremony (i.e. the Native Courts.) Many of the actions taken by
District Officers served more to strengthen central control at the Distict Level than
to build strong local institutions.
The result of this pattern of early colonial rule was, as in Asia, the demise
of the power of the traditional 'democratic' institutions such as the local village
councils, a compromise of the leadership role of the chief and a general loss of
popular confidence and respect in local institutions. The centralized structure of
power and resources would seem to make this result inevitable. Furthermore, the
guiding policy of indirect rule aimed at preservation of indigenous institutions but
never laid out a strategy for their evolution and integration into the larger system of
government, leaving room for Governors and District Officers to sideline their devel-
opment. Cowan is more generous in his assessment, suggesting that "the exponents
of indirect rule, in their zeal to prevent the destruction of indigenous institutions,
inadvertently prevented them from evolving at their normal tempo and so aided in
their eventual stultification." [Cowan, p.23]
In the 1950's, the British Colonial Office requested its overseas territories to
introduce major reforms to their local government systems so as to align them more
closely to the British domestic model. The intended reforms noted below were set
forth in a 1947 dispatch of the colonial secretary in what is often referred to as the
Creech-Jones Memorandum on Local Government[Mawhood and Davey, p.405]:
1. Local authorities should be institutionally separate from central government
and assume responsibility for a significant range of local services (primary
28
education, clinics and preventive health services, community development,
and secondary roads being the most common).
2. These authorities should have their own funds and budgets and should raise
a substantial part of their revenue through local direct taxation.
3. Local authorities should employ their own qualified staff, who could be sec-
onded from the civil service where necessary in the early stages.
4. The authorities would be governed internally by councils, predominantly com-
posed of populary elected members.
5. Government administrators would withdraw from an executive to an advisory
inspectorial role in relation to local government.
The problem with this request was that the British model was based on "an
island country with a strongly developed sense of unity." [Wraith, 1953, p.18] In
this environment, the model could be standardized and uniform in all parts of
England with confidence that local institutions with specified powers and duties
would perform what was expected of them without much interference needed. The
African environment was quite the opposite.
Because of the diversity among traditional or 'native' authorities, direct appli-
cation of these reforms meant major modification or elimination of the Native Au-
thorities to make way for the new local government administrative structure. These
reforms were only half-heartedly implemented and in a way so as not to compromise
the powers and resources of the District Government. This established a popularly-
held attitude toward the new local government structure as politically superfluous
and functionally inferior to the well-established District level of government.
In practice, the manner in which these reforms were implemented created an un-
stable foundation for the future of modern local government. In many Anglophone
countries in Africa, the approach to implementing these reforms was to create mul-
tiple layers of local government while still retaining strong supervisory authority
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and control of financial resources at the District level. In Uganda for example, the
primary unit of local government became the parish (similar to the commune in the
French-influenced systems) but the parish was made a sub-division of the division
and the division a sub-division of the county and the county a sub-division of the
district. This layered-approach significantly removed the operations and interests of
the primary local government unit, the parish, from the direct attention of District
and Central Government and created overlapping authorities which interferred with
the natural development of local government institutional capacity.
To avoid the delegation of taxing authority to each local council level, the dis-
trict council was designated as the rating and rate-collection authority for central
government direct taxes (poll tax or capitation tax), the main source of local author-
ity operating revenues. The sub-units of local government to the district obtained
their share of the revenues from precepts levied on the district taxing councils.
The district council in this system controled local budgets and expenditures of all
sub-bodies by determining in its own annual budget the amount of the demands
from sub-bodies it would recognize and setting the tax rates accordingly. Local
government councils did have authority to levy property taxes but local resistance
was significant (often encouraged by central and district government political au-
thorities), the available assessment mechanisms rudimentary, and the problems of
unclear tenure prohibitive. Other revenue sources such as fees and charges for mu-
nicipal services or the use of municipal facilities and proceeds from various local
government commercial undertakings remained underexploited because in many
countries the local authorities were debarred by statute from making any profits.
It was not uncommon for District Councils to push increased functional respon-
sibilities onto unformed or inexperienced local government institutions without the
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resources to carry them out and, when they failed to perform, to use this as an
excuse to remove certain local government authorities to higher sub-units of gov-
ernment or to central government parastatals. Even in areas such as Kenya were an
absence of strong chieftancies had permitted the system of 'indirect rule' to be fairly
successful in forming reasonably well-functioning local institutions, the manner of
interpretation of the local government reforms built in the failure of these local
institutions because the reigns of power, the resources and the credibility remained
at the District level.
The local government image deteriorated further at the hands of highly cen-
tralized national unification movements during the immediate post-independence
decades of the 1960's and 1970's which saw local government as a dangerous vehicle
for promoting tribal separatism and intertribal conflict. Serious remedial reforms to
shore up local government administrative and financial deficiencies began to appear
only in the 1980's with the recognition of the substantial growth of local authorities
and their services needs and the consequent drain of their financial demands on
national and district level governments.
In retrospect, the theory behind the system of 'indirect rule,' that of convert-
ing or evolving traditional social institutions in Africa into modern, uniform local
government institutions may have seemed clearly achievable to the Englishman at
the turn of the century, using England as his frame of reference. Because of the
complexity and diversity of the social and cultural environment in Africa and the
power of existing traditional institutions, the system was not only a failure in many
of the territories but also possibly retarded the natural evolution of traditional insti-
tutions toward more effective, indigenous structures of local government. 'Indirect
rule' secured and preserved the position of the tenured traditional rulers, shielding
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them from the natural forces of change which would have been demanded
from their own peoples through the traditional village councils. When reform of
existing traditional institutions proved too difficult for the British in situ, in its ap-
plication, the system of 'indirect rule' became increasingly centralized, reinforcing
the imported British ideas without reference to their propriety for local conditions.
Much confusion was generated by the British commitment to a parallel but un-
equal local government structure of Districts and 'Native Authorities'. By establish-
ing a centralized British administrative structure administered at the all-powerful
District level while at the same time promoting preservation of social governing tra-
ditions through the Native Authorities and yet subjecting these latter institutions
to major foreign administrative reforms, both levels of government were compro-
mised. The consequence was to seriously retard the progress that might have been
expected toward establishing a uniform and rational system of local government.
2.2.2 The French Model
While the French were also colonizers in Indo-China and the Caribbean, the princ-
ipal French colonial presence was felt in Africa. France, through her military ex-
plorers, had by the 1900's laid claim or offered protection to the countries of the
Mahgreb (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya); Equatorial Africa (the ter-
ritories of Chad, Gabon, Middle Congo and Ubangi-Shari) which it organized into
a federation in 1910; and most of West Africa which was confederated in 1920 and
included the states of Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Sudan, Upper Volta,
Niger and Mauritania plus two trust territories, Togo and the Cameroons.
For the French, the colonial experience of the 18th to 20th century was more
than just a political and economic aggrandissement of the mother country. It was
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a crusade of sorts to bring civilization to the uncivilized, and carried out with
missionary fervor. The early French colonizers were impassioned by the political
philosophy of the eighteenth century French Revolution which proposed the natural
state of all reasoning men to be one of liberty, equality and fraternity. Since this
universalist philosophy with its associated republican institutions was not widely
adopted in Europe, it became inexorably identified with the French language, cul-
ture and institutions. A policy of 'assimilation', defined above, which some have
called cultural imperialism, became a logical vehicle for transmitting these 'truths.'
Assimilation became the backbone of the French colonial policy so much so that in
Africa, a native who fully embraced the French culture, language and was trained in
French schools was accepted as a social equal to a Frenchman of similar class. Much
like the convertees to some religion, a clear social distinction was made between the
'evolues'(evolved or assimilated) and the 'non-evolues'(non-assimulated).
The importance of this policy of assimilation for this thesis on local government
is the fact that native institutions were viewed by the French as worthless and
requiring replacement as soon as populations could be maneuvered into accepting
the replacement. The cowing of the local populations was accomplished in large
part through the destruction or co-optation of the traditional leadership structure.
Secondly, the imposition of the French culture on several generations of colonials
and with it the moral conviction of its essential rightness as a substitute for their
own 'inferior' cultures and institutions has had grave consequences on the ability
of later generations to move from a state of dependence and apathy at the local
level toward one of assuming responsibility for the design and operation of local
government.
Unlike the British model, the administrative structure of the French overseas
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model of local government was a direct replication of the domestic government
system in France. For this reason, it is useful to outline here the basic structure
and division of power within the local government system of France.
The local government system in France itself underwent a major redesign at the
the hands of Napoleon in 1800 to make the power of the executive all important
and to rigidly re-establish a structure of central control. This was in reaction to the
local autonomies, alluded to earlier, which had sprung up during the Feudal era.
The structure of local government emerging from the Revolution, both rational and
uniform in keeping with the universalist philosophy of that period, was contrived
to control the widely scattered and geographically-separated agricultural popula-
tions in France. The system established included two levels of local government:
1)a system of Departments, also called Prefectures containing all the decentralized
offices of the national ministries, each Department headed by a 'prefect' who was
appointed by Government Decree to be the sole legal representative of the State;
and 2) a system of Communes within each Department which were population
centers, both rural and urban, each Commune headed by a Mayor who originally
was a State-appointed official, later becoming a locally elected official. There was
also created within each Department two overlapping, non-corporate administrative
sub-divisions called cantons (a grouping of communes) and arrondissements, also
called sous-prefectures (a geographic subdivision), both to facilitate Department
administration and delivery of services. These entities were really extensions of the
authority of the Department and never had any corporate or electoral structure.
The administration of both Departments and Communes was guided at each govern-
mental level by a consultative body of citizens (conseil general-Department level
and conseil municipal-Commune level) who in the late eighteen hundreds became
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locally-elected bodies in France. In fact, an 1884 law on comm unal administra-
tion gave the full power of decision-making on communal affairs to locally-elected
councils. In theory this law should have subjugated the Mayor to their concilar
authority; but in practice, these powers were never exercised because of other cen-
tral controls structured into the system. Figure 2.1 below is an evolution of this
system, the regions being established in the 1950's, but it still preserves the basic
structure established by Napolean.
Typical of 'centralizing' controls designed into the system is the fact that French
local authorities (Departments and Communes) remained, legally, organs of the
State because their rights and powers were never written into the Constitution.
Rather, they depended on a delegation or grant of power from a higher Constitu-
tionally-defined authority such as the National Assembly. Without Constitutional
definition, French local authorities have been subject to a changing scope of rights
and powers from one Government to the next. Furthermore, the executives of the
two sub-national levels of government, the Prefect and the Mayor, held dual respon-
sibilities to their local councils and to the State, creating a division of allegiance
which has kept the powers of the locally elected councils in check over the decades.
Because local authorities were legally part of the corpus of State institutions, locally
elected councilors were also subject to State scrutiny. A third critical circumscrip-
tion of local powers by the State was the system of 'tutelage' or tutelle whereby
the State or the Executive retained a power of approval (disapproval) over many
local decisions with the authority to render local decisions null and void and, in
the extreme, to dismiss individual councilors or full councils at will. These powers
were administered through a hierarchal structure of State supervision whereby each
member of the Executive, including Mayors and Prefets in their capacity as State
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Figure 2.1: The Structure of Power in France, circa 1981
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representatives, was held accountable for his actions to the next highest adminis-
trative level.
Going back to the Francophone colonial experience, an interesting twist under
the French is that the overseas territories, which today constitute whole countries,
were, until the Loi Cadre of 1956, considered by France to be units of local govern-
ment within their Federations. They had no decision-making authority, receiving
full Executive direction from Paris. The Loi Cadre represented a major deconcen-
tration of control by the French parliament to the African territories. It was brought
on in part by the political pressure of the local government reforms underway in
the British territories. As interpreted by M. Houphouet-Boigny, now President of
the Ivory Coast and then leader of a major political party, RDA, representing the
interests of Afrique Occidentale Francaise in French parliament:
"The essential aim of these reforms is, by accentuating the autonomy
of the territories, to reaffirm their political individuality (personnalite
politique). In a way, this represents the beginning of the road to the
British form of self-government, with however, the maintenance of the
esstential links between the territories and the Republic." [Speech given
at Liege, November 30, 1956]
In the parliamentary debats of the period, however, the French goal was clearly
"not a question of plagiarizing the English" but of diffusing "the profound uneasi-
ness in Europeans and Africans" [in the African territories.] [Debats parlementaires,
Assemblee nationale, Journal officiel, 1956, p. 1108 ff] The institutional and admin-
istrative reforms realized under the Loi Cadre withdrew powers from the Federation
capitals in Dakar and Brazzaville and transferred them to the territories, permit-
ting them individually to establish their own Executive (conseils de gouvernement
or ministerial cabinets) and an internal system of local government. The local
government systems established exactly replicated that of France and in no way
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reflected any influence of the British local government reforms.
As indicated above, a highly-centralized and hierachically controlled system of
local government administration was transferred in tact to the French colonies with
real legislative and executive power remaining centralized in Paris. The adminis-
trative structure included the Governor General of the Federation as the supreme
head of government directly responsible to the President of France. The Governor
General was assisted by a conseil du gouvernement comprised of the Lieutenant
Governor of each colony. At the capital of each colony, the Lieutenant Governor
established a conseil d'administration of a mix of elected and appointed members
to assist in the colonial administration and approve the colonial budget. Elected
representation was an empty gesture, however, as most Africans could not qualify to
vote. The conseil d'administrations became the forerunner of the conseils generaux
mentioned below and later evolved in post WWII into territorial assemblies. At the
local level, the colony (or territory) was divided into cercles and subdivisions, also
known as regions and districts. Each region and district were run by administrators
(prefets du region and prefets) who themselves were supreme in their administrative
area.
In the area of financial administration, there is little to discuss with respect
to the local government level as local government didn't really exist in the British
sense of the term. All finances were tightly controlled at the top of the apex,
the metropole in Paris with budget approvals passed through the Federations to
the individual territories and on down the ladder of administrative hierarchy. The
Federations raised revenues through indirect taxes, largely from export-import duties
and from a general consumption tax called the taxe de consommation interieure.
The Territories raised operating revenues through direct taxes collected on behalf
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of the Federation and partially rebated to them. These tax returns were known
as ristourne de droits. The indirect taxes, particularly the customs dues were far
more productive than the direct taxes. This made clear by the figures for the 1955
operating budget (budget de fonctionnement) of the Federation of West Africa where
of the total 26.7 billion franc budget, almost 15 billion francs came from import-
export duties and 7 billion francs from the taxe de consummation interieure.[FWA,
p.2 and 7]
The budgets of the territories consisting of Federal grants and rebates on taxes
were determined annually by a general assembly (grand conseil) at the Federation
level, whose membership was 'elected' from the collection of conseils generaux or
territorial assemblies within the Federation. Within each territory, the territorial
assembly controlled the power of collection and rate setting for all types of taxes
levied within the territory, including those collected by the communal authorities.
It also approved the budgets of the lower orders of government. Given the different
productive levels of revenue generation between the federations and the territories,
the territories became increasingly dependent on Federal grants and budget deficit
subsidies to the extent that they neglected aggressive budget and revenue manage-
ment within their territories. This behavior pattern established a poor model for
the development of rational financial management structures within the colonies.
In practice, while the commune was and still is the primary unit of local gov-
ernment in the French system, only a minor part of the colonized countries ever ex-
perienced the full representative communal form of government because the French
considered few centers important enough to grant full communal status. In fact,
only four full communes existed in the two Federations up until 1955. These were
St Louis, Rufisque and Dakar in Senegal and Abidjan in Ivory Coast. As a result,
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there was little opportunity in the former French colonies to develop any experi-
ence with the responsibilities of self-government at the local level. According to
Coleman, "the French indifference or resistence towards local government reform in
Afrique Noire [was] as much the uncritical extension to Africa of the 'statist' and
centralist tradition of metropolitan France as it [was] a special imperial device for
discouraging African autonomy." [Coleman, p.55]
I would conjecture, less radically, that the French were strongly driven by their
educative philosophy of assimilation in Africa which heavily influenced their ap-
proach to local government. The French actually established a graduated system of
representation for the communes in Africa by creating several different categories.
The communes de plein exercise, mentioned above, was the only category with
an elected mayor and council to carry out the functions of municipal government;
even so, their powers were severely restricted and their budgets approved and con-
trolled by the central administration through the conseil general acting on behalf
of the Lieutenant Governor. Furthermore, voting in local elections was limited to
French and Africans who had become naturalised French citizens so that full uni-
versal sufferage had little real representative value among the Africans. In 1920,
France created a second category of communes in the French territories called com-
munes mixtes. This category was divided into three classes according to the level of
elected repesentation allowed. Communes of the first degree had a municipal coun-
cil (commission municipale) nominated by the Lieutenant Governor; communes of
the second degree had a council elected by restricted sufferage; and communes of
the third degree had a council elected by full universal sufferage but its mayor was
appointed by the Lieutenant Governor. In fact the office of mayor for all three
classes within the category of communes mixtes was an appointed position of the
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central administration. The theory behind the French policy of gradual granting of
representation was explained in 1921 by the then Governor General of French West
Africa as follows:
"This progressive education, of which the last stage will be the full
autonomy of the commune de plein exercise will make it possible to
extend the benefit of municipal institutions to units at different stages of
evolution.... This apprenticeship in public life.. .[constitutes] the most
rational and sensible political machinery for our African populations,
which it is our duty to associate in an ever increasing measure in the
management of their own affairs." (Cited in [Buell, p.964])
It is interesting to take note of this progressive system of responsibility as a similar
concept is now emerging in the former Francophone colonies in their decentraliza-
tion process for which Nellis has coined the term 'tutorial decentralization'. This
approach will be discussed in the Moroccan case in Chapter 4.
With the advent of independence for the various colonies, this system of pro-
gresssive education was lost when newly formed nations moved in the direction of
more rigid centralization as a strategy for protection against internal political divi-
sion. Thus, the centralization of the French model, coupled with the psychological
legacy of assimilation policy and the recentralization under independence under-
mined any possibility for the development of a strong local government base or the
evolution of capacity, confidence, and enthusiasm among local government elected
officials.
Typically, the former French colonies have continued to closely imitate the ad-
ministrative reforms of the mother country, France, in their own local government
reforms at home, though with considerable lag time and with limited real decentral-
ization of powers. A serious debate over local reforms and regionalization of power
began in the early 1970's in France with progressive 'decentralization' reforms sprin-
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kled throughout the 1970's and early 1980's.[Borja, p.5] The decentralization trend
began to appear in local government reforms in former French colonies in North
Africa in the late 1970's and in West and Central Africa in the early 1980's. Back
in the 1960's, Chapman identified the Commune of France as "the only primary area
for local government." [Chapman, p.14] Indeed, the local government administrative
reforms which have appeared over the last two decades in Francophone countries
of the Third World have focused on decentralizing responsibilities and powers to
the Communes. The Ivory Coast exemplifies the current enthusiasm for communal
reform. In 1980 legal textes were enacted under the title Organization Municipale
en Cote d'Ivoire-Loi No. 80-1180 which raised 37 communes mixtes to the status of
communes de plein exercise, 10 of which were municipalities making up the capital
city, Abidjan. This reform was followed in 1985 by a revision elevating the number
of communes from 37 to 134 including both rural and urban communes. While
the political enthusiasm of the reform movement has elevated the number of com-
munes with legally defined authorities, an implementation strategy has yet to be
worked out and many designated communes, in an embryonic state of institutional
development, may never exercise their full powers.
In summary, the French colonial regime did succeed in establishing a uniform ad-
ministrative system of governance in the Francophone countries of the Third World
but the model, replicating French public administration, was highly centralized with
little or no effort to develop the institutional structure of local government. The
policy of assimilation destroyed traditional local institutions and prejudiced local
populations against their cultural institutional heritage. The consequence has been
that local government institutions have remained underdeveloped and dependent
on the center. Recent trends in France to reinforce local government powers and
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resources are being copied in administrative reforms in the Francophone countries
of the Third World. The decentralization policy represented by these reforms re-
mains largely rhetorical, even in instances of a favorable political climate, because
of the embryonic stage of development of the institutional infrastructure of all but
the largest local government units.
As is evident from this chapter review, historic cultural influences and colonial
policy appear to have played a major role in undermining the natural development of
strong, indigenous local government institutions and systems in the Third World.
Consequently, developing countries in the 1980's are finding it difficult to imple-
ment and institutionalize decentralization policy at the what Chapman termed the
primary area for local government which, under the British system, are the munic-
ipalities and, under the French system, the Communes.
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Chapter 3
Framing A Dynamic Process:
Definitions And Typology Of
Decentralization Policy
In the last chapter, I discussed the historic influences which have shaped the environ-
ments out of which decentralization policy is now emerging. In this chapter, I will
first set forth the basic definitions associated with the concept of decentralization.
Using these definitions, I will then construct a typology of decentralization not so
much to show a continuum between the poles of centralization and decentralization
as to give some dimension to the decentralization process.
The concept of decentralization is difficult to define because it is not simply a
development technique to be applied to certain features of the existing system but
instead it is "an entire alternative strategy in itself." [Nellis, 1983, p.174] Decentral-
ization is a broadly based process which, while not undermining the foundation
of the existing political/administrative system, does progressively alter the way in
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which the system is perceived and operated. While the conventional definitions
of the decentralization process and elements of its policy language in Third World
countries often come from external sources, the process itself as it is played out is
a creature of the local environment and therefore 'different' for every country.
3.1 Modernizing Conventional Definitions
The definition of 'decentralization' has lost lexical clarity as a result of the pre-
ponderance of literature generated since the 1950's on the subject using similar
terminology to define the activities in many fields beyond development administra-
tion. For example, Peter Drucker in The Practice of Management writes of a trend
toward "federal decentralization of the corporate entity" in the business world.
[Drucker, p.205] In many of the Western Nations, the term decentralization has
become politically popularized to the extent that it carries a connotation of being
positive and its antonym negative, which value judgement is carried by donors into
the Third World development theatre. Landau and Eagle describe decentralization
and centralization as being "loaded terms" in the United States where the former
is 'good' and the latter 'bad.' They also suggest that "the present emphasis on de-
centralization in the United States Agency for International Development [USAID)
derives from the negative connotations of its antonym... not from considerations
of its utility." [Landau and Eagle, p.4] Finally, there has been considerable misuse
(abuse) of the term 'decentralization' by political leaders and administrators to de-
scribe a variety of policies for which they seek popular support or to mask the true
operations of an unpopular public administration. Subramaniam wrote of "Anglo-
phone countries using the rhetoric of decentralization to draw a veil over the reality
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of centralization." [Subramaniam, 1980, p.590] Achour described the decentraliza-
tion concept in Tunisia as "a political myth used by an aging leadership to offset
criticizm of their centralized single party rule." [Achour and Moussa, p.348-349]
Definitions are essential to establishing a typological framework of the organiz-
ing principles of different types of decentralization. It is, I think, useful to look at
the evolution of definitions of decentralization over the last three decades and to
remember that the 'reality' of various forms of government administrative organi-
zation in the developing countries has itself been in a constant state of transition,
requiring regular adaptation of definitions to describe any new empirical evidence.
3.2 Conventional Definitions of the 1960's
In the bureaucratic environment of the 1950's, the British and French colonial ad-
ministrations employed the terms 'deconcentration' and 'decentralization' to define
the quite different modernizing trends in local government administration occurring
within these two colonial powers or promoted by them as policy to their colonies.
The trend in France was toward economic decentralization or 'regionalization' of
planning and development responsibilities to permit a more balanced economic
development of the nation. This trend was accompanied by administrative reor-
ganization or deconcentration to accommodate the new regional orientation. But,
as Cohen notes, "this was regionalism from the center, with no decentralization of
decision-making at all." [Ross and Cohen, p. 731] It was a movement that was based
on the "special politics of economic administration well outside the traditional polit-
ical arena," and thus made no attempt to consider issues of any lower order partici-
pation in decision-making. This re-orientation affected the French colonies through
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the Loi Cadre of 1956 which embodied the same emphases on decentralization of eco-
nomic development and deconcentration of administration. In contrast, the English,
as evidenced by the Colonial Secretary's (Creech Jones) Dispatch of 1947 (see Chap-
ter 2), were intent on introducing reforms in their colonies which would bring them
closer to the British domestic model of local government. The main emphasis of the
reforms was on legal decentralization, establishing local authorities that were "sepa-
rate legal entities" from central government with their own staff and "independent
accounts and budgets, partly financed by direct taxation." [Mawhood and Davey,
p.406-407
In two of the original building blocks of the English language decentralization
literature, UN Report(ST/TA O/M/19) Decentralization for National and Local De-
velopment(1962) and Democracy, Decentralization and Development(1963), Henry
Maddick made a major lexicographical decision, criticized by some[Mawhood and Davey,
p.2], to establish the notion of 'decentralization' as an umbrella term "embracing
both processes of deconcentration and devolution." [Maddick, p.23] These two key
types of decentralization, he defined as:
Deconcentration: the delegation of authority adequate for the discharge of spec-
ified functions to staff of a central department who are situated outside the
headquarters.
Devolution: the legal conferring of powers to discharge specified or residual func-
tions upon formally constituted local authorities.
As Maddick was an English scholar, not surprisingly his definitions reflected an
English legal perspective and were biased toward the English model of local gov-
ernment. Maddick made a legal distinction between the two types of decentraliza-
tion. The legal constitution under devolution of local authorities with legally-defined
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powers and functions distinct from the central government, affording independent
decision-making authority, distinguished it from the non-legal administrative redis-
tribution of functions under deconcentration where "the effective control [particu-
larly over allocative decisions] remains at the center." [Conyers, 1983, p.102] These
two terms, deconcentration and devolution, became the conventional definitions for
decentralization in the English language literature.
While many of the French colonies were still under French control during the
1950's and early 1960's, for a number of the recently liberated English colonies, this
was a period of initial experimentation with new forms of public administration.
After years of submission to a heavily bureaucratic and centralized British over-
seas administration, the national leadership of some countries moved ideologically
toward the establishment of the British 'domestic model' of independent or semi-
autonomous local government units. The writings of African leaders Kaunda of
Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania and Nkrumah of Ghana and even the religious tenets
of Gandhi in India hardened the legal versus administrative definitional distinction
between the two types of decentralization.
There was a burst of literature in the 1950's in India on the subject of decentral-
ization and the role of local government as this great nation searched for new admin-
istrative forms. A government committee report in 1957 defined decentralization as
"a process whereby the government divests itself completely of certain duties and
responsibilities and devolves them on to some other authority." [Republic of India,
p.7] New terms were coined: 'democratic decentralization' versus 'administrative
decentralization' [Narain] and 'local self-government' versus 'local self-administra-
tion' to further specify what had become politically-charged definitions of decen-
tralization.
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Iqbal Narain, an Indian author, wrote a succinct essay in 1963 distinguishing
among these terms on the basis of legitimate power as opposed to derived power.
The organizing principle of democratic decentralization (also termed devolution or,
a decade later, participatory democracy, see [Kaunda, 1974]) he wrote, "embodies
a right" and, "stands for enjoyment of original power by the people." [It is] "an
extension of the democratic principle-extension of people's right to manage their
own affairs in a local area without any undue interference from regional or national
authorities." On the other hand, administrative decentralization (also deconcentra-
tion or delegation) "is the outcome of administrative expediency and is the exercise
of derived power by a subordinate authority to be exercised [not as a right] at the
pleasure of the superior." [Narain, p.12-13] Narain footnotes English author Mon-
tague Harris to clarify the difference in the governing structures which house these
organizing principles: Local self-government "implies government by the people
themselves through freely elected representatives;" while local self-administration
"exists wherever there is local self-government, but may also exist where a local
authority merely carries out the orders of a higher authority, more or less in its own
way." [Harris, p.9]
While the rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s leaned universally toward legal or
'political' decentralization, the real experiments such as the peoples democracies
of Sudan, the ujamaa village movement of Tanzania, the panchayati raj of India
were structured as a deconcentration of central government functions, extending
the center to the local level in the form of a district council or a community devel-
opment administration but with no discernable decentralization of decision-making
authority to local populations. Hence Singvi's description earlier quoted of India's
panchayati raj as "mere executive agencies of the state governments" [Singhvi, p.143]
49
and Fortmann's paradoxical observation in Tanzania that "in a nation with a strong
ideological commitment to local control, even what would appear to be the minu-
tiae of village life are subject to central control." [Fortmann, p.79] Thus, as Smith
so aptly put it, the ambiguities of the language of decentralization were used by
political leaders in the early years of decentralization to cover the ambiguities of
their own politics.[Smith, 1985]
3.3 Modernizing Definitions in the 1980's
The simple struggle from the 1950's through the 1970's between the two types of
decentralization, deconcentration and devolution, has evolved to a complex assort-
ment of administrative styles in the developing countries in the 1980's in order
to accommodate each country's policy objectives and environmental (historic, po-
litical, cultural, economic) peculiarities. Once sharp distinctions of 'legal' versus
'administrative' have become blurred as the traditional types of decentralization
have converged to form new hybrids. Consequently, current authors of the lexicon
of decentralization (Conyers, Cohen et al, Landau and Eagle, Rondinelli), while
retaining the old terms, are attempting to broaden their meaning to accommo-
date new forms of deconcentration-devolution as well as to establish new terms to
describe what is happening today.
Authors still use 'decentralization' as a blanket or umbrella term to frame the
types or categories of decentralization they have identified in various countries over
the last decade. Definitions of the old categories have been loosened and new
categories, such as delegation [to autonomous public agencies] and privatization [in-
cluding delegation to non-public entities], have been added. The new types fall
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somewhere between the notion of power transfer and that of central government
administrative-restructuring; and in operation, represent something of both. Most
observers of decentralization policy implementation would assert that this broaden-
ing of decentralization categories in number and definition signals a trend more to-
ward the restructuring of central government administration through decentralized
centralization or what Apthorpe and Conyers have termed 'decentralization within
centralization,' than an actual transfer of power.[Apthorpe and Conyers, 1982]
3.3.1 Deconcentration
Rondinelli and Nellis's modernized definition of the old term 'deconcentration' offers
little notion of conceptual change from that of Maddick in 1963:
deconcentration: "The handing over of some administrative authority or respon-
sibity to lower levels within central government ministries and agencies-a
shifting of workload from centrally located officials to staff or offices outside
the national capital." [Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986, p.6]
To this definition, Cohen would add the clarification that "deconcentration is an
administrative action and does not alter the flow of command [no basic transfer of
power] in the system." [Cohen, p.19] Some authors such as Coralie Bryant (1982) pre-
fer the term 'administrative decentralization' to describe deconcentration. Since the
responsibilities which are most often transferred are in the area of project planning
and implementation, she would further specify this definition to "the delegation
of some implementing powers to local levels..with some element of discretion and
responsibility over the nature of those services at that level." [Bryant and White,
p.160] Using his definition quoted above, Rondinelli has identified 'deconcentration'
as the most common form of decentralization over the last decade in the develop-
51
ing countries. He gives examples of Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, Tunisia, the
Philippines, Morocco, Sri Lanka.
3.3.2 Delegation To Public Agencies
The next type of decentralization, delegation to public agencies, can in many re-
spects be seen as a sub-category of deconcentration since its form is often distinct
only in that the agent is usually a separate management entity created by and ap-
pended to central government rather than being central government itself. Keeping
with Rondinelli and Nellis's definitions:
delegation: "The transfer of managerial responsibility [but not sovereign author-
ity] for specifically defined functions to organizations outside the regular bu-
reaucratic structure such as public corporations, regional development agen-
cies, special function agencies, semi-autonomous project implementation units,
diverse parastatal organizations." [Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986, p.7]
Landau and Eagle would make a distinction between different types of delega-
tion, that is between the act of "delegating authority" versus the act of "granting au-
thority." The latter is more recognized as a transfer of decisional authority enabling
independent action by the recipients and thus constitutes a transfer or 'devolution'
of power. The former establishes an 'acting for' status for the recipients. They
remain "instructed actors" [without] "any independent status." [Landau and Eagle,
p.5-6] The problem with this interpretation is that a grant of authority is still pre-
carious as it is not a constitutional mandate and can be withdrawn at the discretion
of the center.
A word needs to be said here concerning the era of the public agency or paras-
tatal and why this type of decentralization was added to the lexicon. The rapidly
expanding economies and populations of developing countries in the 1960's and
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1970's encouraged many developing countries to create scores of national public
agencies and quasi-public agencies in order to expand the archaic and heavily bu-
reaucratic management structures of central government quickly and without loss
of central control. While many of these agencies, as Cohen points out, had "an
independent legal status," they were generally dependent on central government for
their operating budgets, most often staffed by civil service employees and politi-
cally [because of central government controls and interference] unable to function
according to principles of market economics.[Cohen, p.20]
Under policies of administrative decentralization, such national public agencies
were typically decentralized to the regional and local levels where they assumed
responsibility for public services delivery and investment on behalf of the central
government, often usurping traditional local level responsibilities and leaving lit-
tle opportunity for the development of local administrative and fiscal management
expertise essential to modern local government operation. The creation of a decen-
tralized structure of public agencies to represent central government in the field was
urged by international donors thinking this would bring decision-making authority
closer to the people and thus be more responsive to their needs. For the most part,
however, the hierarchy created was center-responsive, poorly-managed and had to
be deficit-financed. The majority of entities created, even in cases where they had
been granted powers to permit their independence, operated as "instructed actors"
of central government. The economic stringency of the 1980's has sounded a death
knell for many public entities represented by this category of decentralization.
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3.3.3 Delegation To Private Enterprise and Parallel Orga-
nizations
The same donors once supporting creation of an enlarged, decentralized public
sector are now behind the dismantling and/or replacement of this supplemental
public institutional infrastructure. The replacement process would develop a system
of relationships partly with quasi-private or non-public organizations legally bound
or politically persuaded to act on behalf of central government and partly with fully
private entities granted the right to provide public services. The shift in emphasis
from public to private is issuing in a new type of decentralization called privatization
which Cohen defines as follows:
privatization: "The shift of supply responsibility from public authorities to pri-
vate parties in certain erstwhile public goods areas... the critical difference
[from public supply being] that production becomes a right of private prop-
erty. As a result, it is not subject to the upper level governmental policy
direction which public agenices may receive, and any accumulation of profits,
etc. remains in private hands." [Cohen, p.27]
As was the case with the various types of delegation mentioned above, privatiza-
tion itself has a number of forms which can allign it more closely to deconcentration
or alternatively, more closely to devolution. Three major forms of privatization can
be mentioned here:
contracting-out: "Transferring the task of supplying public services to other gov-
ernmental jurisdictions or to private organizations instead of delivering the ser-
vices through a government's own personnel. This generally takes the form a
the government retaining the role of 'service facilitator,' financing and regulat-
ing the service but transferring to the private sector the role of 'supplier.' Ac-
countability is typically established by means of legal contract." [Nolan, 1986,
p.6-7]
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In a real sense, the ultimate responsibility and authority remains with govern-
ment with the contracted 'private sector' entities acting for government.
delegation to parallel organizations: "Decentralization of public authority to
non-public organizations including voluntary service organizations, industrial
and trade associations, religious organizations, professional groups, unions or
syndicates, development cooperatives, political parties." [Cohen,Nolan, 1986,
Rondinelli and Wilson]
This type of privatization frequently does not represent a formal delegation of
public authority and responsibilities but rather an official recognition of the suit-
ability of various interest groups to perform certain activities. Most often the ac-
tivities of these associations are not legally 'contracted' with government as was the
case in a) above, but they are tolerated and even encouraged (verbal and financial
support) by government where they are seen to be politically or socially useful.
Rondinelli suggests in reference to the activities of these local interest groups that
"decentralization may be implicit in the concept of 'debureaucratization,' that is,
allowing decisions to be made through political processes that involve larger num-
bers of special interest groups, rather than having the decisions made exclusively
or primarily by government through legislation, executive decree or administrative
regulation." [Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986, p.9] In the 1980s, this type of privatiza-
tion is more and more overtly encouraged by governments strapped for resources
because it facilitates the participation of local populations in the social and eco-
nomic development of their communities and the mobilization of local resources. In
countries moving increasingly toward true political decentralization, one might ex-
pect to see a mushrooming of parallel organizations and their eventual formalization
and integration into the political process.
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free market and divestiture: "Free market is the private provision of goods and
services in response to market demand where the government is not involved in
the transactions at all, or only minimally involved through some regulation.
Divestiture is the sale of government assets for the provision of goods and
services to the private sector with the assumption that market demand will
stimulate sufficient production by the private sector." [Nolan, 1986, p.11)
This form of privatization is the closest to devolution because the rights to pri-
vate property must be acknowledged which, as indicated above in Cohen's definition
of privatization, limits the degree of policy control by government. The government
forfeits direct control of activities but still supervises the operations of the private
sector through regulation. The major inhibiting factor to free market growth of
private sector services then becomes inappropriate government regulation.
3.3.4 Devolution
Finally, we can take a look at the 1980s modifications to the old 1960s decentraliza-
tion term 'devolution.' Going back to Rondinelli, the modernized term is defined
as follows:
devolution: The creation or strengthening, financially or legally, of sub-national
units of government, whose activities are substantially outside the direct con-
trol of the central government.[Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986, p. 8]
Rondinelli and Conyers both acknowledge that, in practice, where a form of devo-
lution is in place such as in Papua, New Guinea, the central government usually re-
tains some supervisory powers and makes large financial transfers.[Rondinelli, 1980,
Conyers in Stohr] Conyers prefers to ignore the old distinction between devolution
and deconcentration, being convinced that the majority of developing countries are
implementing some form of hybrid of the two. What is particularly interesting in
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this definition of devolution above is that conceptually devolution is now acknowl-
edged to exist where there is a 'degree' of authority transfer rather than requiring
absolute independence of the local government unit as in the British model popular
in the 1950's. Even more significant is the fact that the importance of financial
empowerment is put on an equal footing to legal empowerment.
The conceptual modifications to the definition of devolution are indicative of
the new trends for decentralization in the 1980's. The emphasis is no longer on
the creation of autonomous local government units but rather on the restructuring
of intergovernmental relations as a whole to permit a decentralization of central
government operations. The 'new decentralization' suggests a blending of the old
notions of devolution-deconcentration which implies power-sharing among the dif-
ferent levels of government while maintaining a degree of control and coordination
at the center. As power is equated to absolute decision-making authority, the strug-
gle in defining the new relationships is to decide on the nature and degree of the
decision-making authority to be transferred to sub-national government units and
in particular to local government. The key issue on which the debate is turning
in many developing countries is whether or not to permit a decentralization of
allocative decisions accompanied by a restructuring of fiscal relationships and a re-
distribution of revenue-generating mechanisms. This is a highly political topic as
control of resources is at the root of power and has created at the central govern-
ment level a class of political elite whose livelihood and longevity has depended on
their control of resources.
Whether rhetoric or reality, many countries in the 1980's have adopted 'decen-
tralization' strategies which use varying interpretations of the Western terminology
elaborated above. In any number of cases, reforms that look overtly to be a step
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toward greater decentralization are in reality a justification for structuring greater
political control of the center at the lower governmental levels. In sum, the use
of the academic language of decentralization to define systems of local government
administration in the Third World offers marginal clarity unless it is used in con-
junction with a detailed description of a particular country's system so that the
terms can be understood in their application context.
3.4 Creating A Typology
In the 1960's, scholars of decentralization policy working with two opposing types
of decentralization, deconcentration and devolution, were content to organize a
typology as a continuum between the poles of extreme centralism and extreme
decentralization and generally moving in one direction from centralization to de-
centralization.
In today's world, there exist many more types of recognized decentralization as
well as a variety of criteria for measuring the degree of decentralization than existed
in the 1960's. Collectively, however, they can not as a whole be confidently used
to classify a country's system since "a system which is more centralized accord-
ing to one criterion may be less centralized according to another." [Conyers, 1983,
p.103][Cohen, p.17] In this sense, systems can be centralizing at the same time they
are decentralizing. Furthermore, as noted above, the terminology defining decen-
tralization is based on Western World concepts which may have different meanings
and structural interpretations in non-Western systems of local government organi-
zation. Finally, not infrequently countries use the terminology of decentralization
as a political vehicle in their stated policy to obscure unstated administrative re-
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form initiatives which may be actually more centralizing in their effects on existing
bureaucratic structures.
Carl Friedrich was one of the first scholars to try to liberate the notion of de-
centralization from its interpretation as a static type of government at some point
on a continuum. Rather, he challenged academicians to think of decentralization
as a dynamic process constantly moving back and forth between centralization and
decentralization:
"It is essential that decentralizing patterns of the distribution of power
be considered as dynamic, rather than static, as continually evolving
and oscillating between greater unity and diversity..."
C. J. Friedrich, from Man and His Government (1963)
The empirical evidence of great variation and frequent changes in the decen-
tralization-centralization balance within the internal intergovernmental systems of
Third World countries in the 1980's requires scholars of today to accept the notion
of decentralization as a process rather that a state of being.
Whereas in the 1960's, countries were emulating Western models of decentral-
ization without initially much modification, today these countries are individually
undertaking series of administrative reforms to design their own decentralization
process in a way which suits specific social, economic or political objectives and
is compatible with the local environment. Conyer's recent article on the subject
captures this idea:
". .. decentralization [should be] seen as a dynamic process of change
[in less developed countries], which can in turn facilitate other sorts of
change, not as a particular type of government structure." [Conyers, 1986,
p.601]
This all presents the problem of how one captures the notion of a 'process' which
is dynamic in a typology which is more of a definitional or static classification tool.
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A typology which is based on a continuum using 'conventional' terms alone can not
really provide much clarity with respect to the proper categorization of a country's
decentralization experience. Since there is as yet no substitution for the conventional
terminology, one alternative is to retain this terminology as a framework for the
typology and to describe each category broadly, based on the empirical evidence
of types of systems that exist today. The process of decentralization might be
understood as the movement or transition from one category of decentralization to
another.
The typology which follows, therefore, represents an artificial continuum of
stages of increasingly decentralized decision-making authority. It moves from a
stage of total centralization to administrative decentralization where the seat of
power remains at the center but individual tasks are delegated to peripheral units
representing the center; to a stage of 'power-sharing' where there is a mix ofcentral-
local controls but where the balance of power tends to remain with the center; to
legal decentralization where the State legally constitutes separate corporate local
bodies to which it transfers governing authority and resources.
There are variations within each 'type' from country to country depending on
local political circumstances, geography and the historical inheritance of colonial-
ism, nationalism and economic development. Movements between 'types' have been
observed over the last decade. Indonesia has moved since the 70s from a type I to a
type II and, if currently proposed reforms are successfully implemented, may move
on towards a type IIIa. Tanzania is moving from a type II toward a type V. Brazil
is drafting a new constitution which should, if implemented, move it from a type
IV to a type IVa. Most Third World countries appear to fall between type II and
type III with recent trends in the direction of type III.
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The categorization of countries within the typology was done on the basis of
literature review and logical guessing. Detailed study of each case would be neces-
sary to be more certain. Any attempt at categorization is complicated by the fact
that a given country's political-administrative system may be transitioning from one
category to another or may have characteristics of several categories simultaneously.
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3.4.1 Typology Of Decentralization
TYPE I: Centralization Recognizing that there exists no such extreme as a
"pure" case of centralization, this type classifies those cases for which all major
decisions are taken at the center. Actions are directed by the center and carried
out by central government-appointed agents. All resources are collected by or for
the center and meted out through a system of center-controlled transfers.
" Zaire
" Korea
e Peru
TYPE Ia: Centralization/City-State Highly centralized operating systems
dictated by the small size and geography of countries. Particularly evident in small
island nations. (Jamaica has recently eliminated the local government authority of
its capital, Kingston)
" Jamaica
* Singapore
TYPE II: Administrative Deconcentration Authorities and/or powers are
delegated to local level bodies represented by a mix of central and local officials.
These local level bodies have no 'corporate' status and often parallel conventional
local government. The local bodies may take the form of development committees
or coordinating committees, lodged at either the middle or local level or between
the two. Fiscally dependent on central government with few own-source revenues.
* Kenya
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* Philippines
" Tunisia
" Indonesia
TYPE III: Legal Deconcentration/Devolution Mix-Middle Level Author-
ities are granted or devolved to legally constituted corporate bodies staffed by a
mix of locally-elected and centrally-appointed representatives. The local bodies are
middle level government such as provinces or districts. They receive transfer of
authority to expand own-source revenues but remain fiscally dependent on central
government transfers.
" Sri Lanka
" Zambia
" Ghana
" Morocco
TYPE IIIa: Legal Deconcentration/Devolution Mix-Local Level Author-
ities are granted or devolved to legally constituted corporate bodies staffed by a mix
of locally-elected and centrally-appointed representatives. These local level govern-
ment bodies are typically municipalities (including metropolitan areas and special
status cities) or, in the french-influenced systems, communes which are akin to the
English 'parish.' Allocative and implementation powers received from central gov-
ernment are generally tied to development functions. Typically high dependency
ratio on central government transfers.
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* Ivory Coast
* Turkey
TYPE IV: Federal System-Deconcentration A federal system where powers
and resources are delegated to middle and local-level bodies but strong control and
intervention in the daily operations of these bodies is exercised by central govern-
ment. Fiscal controls retained at the center though some discretion in allocations
may be delegated to middle and local levels.
" Uganda
" Mexico
e Venezuela
" Argentina
TYPE IVa: Federal System-Devolution A federal system where powers and
resources are devolved to middle and local levels i.e. states and/or municipalities.
Central government retains a national policy planning and guidance role. Local
development planning and implementation, revenue-generation and allocation func-
tions are carried out at sub-national levels. Generally, fiscal decision-making and
controls are devolved to the state level which may further delegate allocative and im-
plementation responsibilities to the local government (municipal) level. Typically,
annual central and state government transfers to local governments are a feature of
such systems. Central government fiscal controls reduced to that exercised through
conditional grants or transfers.
* Nigeria
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. Brazil
TYPE V: Legal Devolution-Dependent Fully-elected local governments with
full legal rights are established at the 'provincial' and/or 'municipal' levels. Sig-
nificant powers and fiscal authorities are tranferred to the local levels including
taxing authorities, especially the property tax. While local governments are con-
stituted as legally-separate, semi-autonomous entities, operationally they remain
highly dependent on central government for fiscal and personnel resources.
* Papua-New Guinea
TYPE VI: Legal Devolution-Independent As in the case of centralization,
there exists no "pure" case of complete decentralization. This category is rather
to classify those countries where local government is moving increasingly toward
fiscal and administrative self-reliance, cooperating with rather than depending upon
central government. Key to the ability of local bodies to function as 'separate
entities' is the power and ability to generate sufficiently important revenue sources
locally so as to permit independent decision-making. Typically, this category may
represent parts of a national system rather than the whole. Successfully functioning
separate entities may be dictated by size, special status, geographic location or
natural resource endowments. (A number of cities in Colombia are claimed to have
achieved a level of financial self-sufficiency)
e Colombia
Simultaneous Types Forms of decentralization which occur simultaneously with
other forms. This is particularly the case where countries are trying to lessen the
administrative burden on central government and its administrative sub units such
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as administerial field offices without losing full control. These types fit more with
the concept of legal deconcentration, type III.
TYPE VII: Privatisation Transfer of the responsibility for executing govern-
mental functions or delivering public services to private entities supervised by cen-
tral or subnational units of government. This may take a variety of forms from the
outright sale of public services, to contracting out to private firms, to the increased
participation of voluntary organizations in the provision and maintenance of public
goods. Except in the case of outright sale of the rights to a public enterprise to
the private sector, the government maintains a supervisory role over private opera-
tions. This type is becoming increasingly frequent in the delivery of urban services,
particularly in the sectors of health, education, transportation and water in Third
World countries.
* Turkey
TYPE VIII: Worker Self-Management and Syndicalism Decentralization
of the decision-making and responsibility to councils of workers within state-run or
private enterprises. Often times it is party associated. This form provides some
direct and democratic control to workers, decentralizing the base of power not only
in economic life, but by association, in political and social life as well. There has
been an erosion in this direction, particularly in highly centrally planned economies.
" Algeria
" Yugoslavia
" Mozambique
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. Chile
TYPE IX: Metropolitan Districts Large capital cities in the Third World have
been decentralized geographically by creating a number of municipalities as separate
corporate entities under the umbrella of a metropolitan authority. The metropolitan
authority retains responsibilities for city-wide services such as solid waste collection
and for infrastructure investments but day-to-day operations and maintenance are
expected to be undertaken by the individual municipal governments. Pressure is
building to truly decentralize fiscal and development decision-making powers to the
individual metropolitan municipalities following failures under the deconcentrated
administrative framework of the metropolitan authority.
" Calcutta, India
" Abidjan, Ivory Coast
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Chapter 4
Transitions and Trends In
Decentralization Policy
Implementation: Selected Country
Briefs
Decentralization policy and progress in any one country is, a creature of complex
and often countervailing forces within its own environment which, for the outside
observer, are difficult to understand. The characteristics of decentralization pol-
icy are determined not only by the country's individual historic, economic and
cultural environment, but also, and most especially, by the political setting into
which the policy is introduced. A policy of decentralization in any form is highly
political because "the process involves a transfer or redistribution of power and
resources." [Cohen, p.17] Therefore things said or done in the name of decentral-
ization may be more in the category of temporal political maneuvering than sus-
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tainable structural decentralization. For example, transitions in the structures and
processes of decentralization within a country may in large measure be a political
response to diffuse local political tensions between the established power elite repre-
senting central control of decision-making and resources and the various indigenous
groups including organized local populations, local intellectuals, middle-range offi-
cials decrying ineffective central government performance and by design or default
promoting internal decentralization reforms.
Pressure is placed on both ends of this political spectrum by foreign parties,
particularly foreign donors, interested in trading development resources for demon-
strated policy reform toward greater efficiency and equity in the use and distri-
bution of resources, which reforms may have both centralizing and decentraliz-
ing impacts. National leaders typically play a central role in how decentraliza-
tion policy is officially represented and whether and how it is implemented. As a
further complication, the rhetoric if not the process of decentralization has been
adopted by a broad range of interest groups within countries as a means of achiev-
ing their objectives whether it be the implementation of rural development pro-
grams [Bryant and White], the drafting of more realistic national development
plan objectives[Van Huyck, 1985], the strengthening of the Party[Lungu, 1983],
the encouragement of popular participation through a form of local democracy.
[Houphouet-Boigny,Kaunda, 1974] The result has been to make decentralization
"an interdisciplinary subject" within countries.[Conyers, 1986]
Obviously, this makes the task of describing and interpreting what is happening
in any one country extremely difficult and comparative studies, especially among
countries from different world regions, achievable only on the basis of gross or very
generalized indicators. For this reason, I have chosen to restrict the two briefs
69
presented in this chapter to countries in Africa which were former British or French
colonies. First, I will discuss the case of the Anglophone country of Zambia which
shows an example of a country whose decentralization rhetoric veils a trend toward
re-centralization. Secondly, I will present the case of the Kingdom of Morocco, a
Francophone country which is pursuing an interesting experiment with incremental
decentralization using a tutorial approach.
4.1 Zambia: An Anglophone Experiment
Various forms of anglophone decentralization experiments have been undertaken
in Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Sudan and Zambia, initiated and promoted by ex-
ceptionally strong national leaders. In all cases, despite the policy rhetoric of the
various regimes, little decentralization has actually occurred. At this point in their
evolution, the experiences must really be classified more as experiments in admin-
istrative reorganization (or administrative deconcentration) to lessen the pressures
on central government. A common problem arising was deconcentration at the top
but replaced by a complex and overlapping system of central officers and agencies
emerging at the subnational levels whose competing authorities and objectives have
stifled any opportunity at the local level for true decentralization.
The Republic of Zambia has been held up as an example of a country struggling
toward increased local autonomy in it central local administrative system. This
image has been in large part built on the rhetoric and writings on 'participatory
democracy' of its strong-man President, Kenneth Kaunda. In the three adminis-
trative reforms (1965, 1969, 1980) it has undergone since its political independence
from Britain in 1964, the country has actually moved from a system of representa-
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tive local councils with relative local autonomy toward a substantial strengthening
of central controls and political Party dominance over local affairs. The result has
been a progressive encroachment by four major interest groups upon local gov-
ernment autonomy since the 1960's. This evolution was forecast by the President
himself in a speech he delivered to announce the 1969 reforms:
"Decentralization in centralism is a measure whereby through the
Party and Government machinery, we still decentralize most of our
Party and Government activities while retaining effective control of
the Party and Government machinery at the centre in the interest of
unity." [Kaunda, 1968]
The key parties to the loss of authority at the local government level have been:
1. Central Government Ministries of Local Government and Finance limiting
local authority in the key areas of budget, administrative functions and per-
sonnel;
2. parastatal agencies usurping traditional service responsibilities of local au-
thorities;
3. Provincial and District Administrations vying to retain the deconcentration
of Government decision-making at the territorial level; and
4. the ruling Party UNIP seizing control of vital staff positions on local councils
and within the local government staffing structure.
Under the British Colonial Government in Zambia, a two strand system of local
government was established. Rural areas where subject to the control of District
Administration and the essentially powerless local 'native authorities' established
under the policy of 'indirect rule.' Urban areas, however, were allowed to develop
and operate as fairly independent units separate from District Administration and
reporting directly to Central Government.
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4.1.1 Minor Reforms during 1927-1975
The Municipal Corporations and Townships Ordinances of 1927 gave urban coun-
cils "wide discretionary powers" which included the authority to raise revenues
locally through a property rating on all municipal council lands and improvements.
[Greenwood and Howell, p.164] Urban councils were made responsible for the provi-
sion of a broad range of local services including markets, slaughterhouses, sewerage
systems, water and electricity systems, solid waste disposal, parks, and police. Func-
tions were essentially the same in municipalities and townships. The 1965 Local
Government Act following Independence in 1964 abolished native authorities but
recognized a system of local government authorities, both rural and urban, with
democratically-elected local councils. This served to reinforce the autonomy of
the existing urban local government units created under British rule and free rural
councils from control by District Administration. An important distinction between
the urban and rural councils was that the former had an elected mayor while the
senior staff of the latter were until 1975 appointed by a statutory Provincial Local
Government Services Board.
Almost simultaneously, the newly independent Zambia launched programs and
reforms contradictory to the notion of strong participatory local government. The
movement to nationalize private enterprises and to create innumerable new pub-
lic corporations or parastatals ballooned the size of Central Government and the
scope of its interference in local affairs. Between 1964 and 1970, the number
of parastatals grew from 10 to 134 "reaching into almost all spheres of Zambian
life." [Lungu, 1983,Johns, p.218] The negative consequence of this movement on lo-
cal urban councils was that parastatals increasingly took over the functions of urban
development (housing, infrastructure) and services delivery, thus reducing, extra-
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legally, local functional authority and leaving little incentive for the development
of local capacity. Greenwood assessed this trend of parastatal development at the
local level to be "the most significant development affecting local authorities since
Independence." [Greenwood and Howell, p.177]
4.1.2 Deconcentration Reforms of 1969
A second important trend toward strengthening the central government role at
lower government levels began with the 1969 reforms which deconcentrated many
Central Government ministry functions to their departments or offices operating
at the District level. The 1969 reforms established District Development Com-
mittees, representing all the institutional players in the districts which included
the local councils, the parastatals, the deconcentrated ministerial departments, the
district administration and the UNIP Party. They also created the position of Dis-
trict Governor as the Central Government's chief political and administrative officer
overseeing all government and Party activities in the District. The District Gover-
nors were the chairpersons of District Development Committees and also chairmen
ex-officio of the rural councils.
The 1969 reforms were promoted by Government as a major decentralization
policy; however, in reality they were nothing more than administrative deconcen-
tration of responsibilities to the District level. These reforms had little effect as
the District Governors were given no statutory authority to enable them to carry
out their functions and were therefore perceived as powerless and largely ignored.
The reforms also did not change the power relationship between central and local
government as local councils still functioned separately from the District level re-
porting directly to the Central Government, specifically to the Ministry of Local
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Government. Local councils were still authorized to recruit and employ their own
staff and budget and manage their own revenues and expenditures.
The structure of intergovernmental relationships following the 1969 reforms are
shown in Diagram 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Structure of District Administration, Zambia, 1969-1980
NATIONAL
HEAD- PARASTATAU 7 CENTRAL NATIONAL PARTY
QUARTERS STATE COMPANIES MINISTRIES HEADQUARTERS
LEVEL
PROVINCIAL
LEVEL
(9 PROVINCES)
DISTRICT
LEVEL PARA- CENTRAL DISTRICT LOCAL PARTY(52 DISTRICTS) STATAL DEPTS. ADM. COUNCILS DISTRICT
DEPTS. HQ
Source: Lungu, Gatian F. 1986, p. 52.
While there was not another comprehensive set of administrative reforms be-
fore 1980, the President and Central Government undertook administrative and
legal initiatives during the 1970's which resulted in the steady deterioration of the
authorities of local government. The powers of the executive President grew enor-
mously with the adoption of a constitutional amendment in 1969 empowering the
President to declare any post in the Public Service political at his discretion. The
President actively exercised this power, and by 1972 had placed most of the senior
Public Service under the Office of the President. This included the positions of the
District Governors.[Lungu, 1980, p.961 His power was considerably reinforced by the
adoption of a one-party State constitution in 1973. Framers of the new constitution
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stressed that "the one-party State would be a participatory democracy in which
decision-making would be decentralized and important groups in the society would
participate in the formulation of policy." In practice, as Scott indicates, "much
was conceded in rhetoric to the feelings of the local officials but little of substance
was given away." Instead, policy-making became increasingly concentrated in the
hands of the President and his advisors, heavily influenced by the political elite in
the form of senior civil servants, parastatal managing directors, trade union leaders,
big business and professional personalities. [Scott, p.147-148]
Since pre-Independence, local governments had the authority to recruit, employ
and dismiss their own staff, both foreign and domestic, subject to the oversight of
the Local Government Service Commission only for cases of senior offical dismissals.
Local authorities lost this power by 1974 with the creation of a Local Government
Service Commission "empowered to recruit, appoint, transfer, promote anddismiss
all local authority staff." [Republic of Zambia, 1975]
Central Government policy contributed to a weakening of the financial position
of councils confronted by increasing demands for services. Aside from earmarked
or specified grants for national public services such as health, the other important
grant was the rate grant. This was paid to local councils in lieu of rates levied
against government property. During the 1970's the rate grant levels due became
very undependable with central government making unilateral cuts of 20-35 percent.
This was not catastrophic as the main revenue sources of particularly the local ur-
ban councils were locally generated through rents, personal levy, and property rates.
While the Central Government didn't hold the purse strings, it controlled rate lev-
els and would not allow local councils to introduce higher charges to meet higher
service costs and demand. Most councils fell seriously in arrears in the collections
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of rents on civil servant housing during the 1970's because Central Government not
only blocked rent increases, but also adopted an act in 1972 withdrawing local gov-
ernment authority to evict tenants in arrears. While this act was not sustained, the
attitude in Central Government against rentor evictions discouraged conscientious
local council enforcement of collection rights. The local councils also lost an im-
portant revenue source in 1973 when Central Government decided to eliminate the
head-lease system of local councils leasing locally-located State land to raise rev-
enues and replaced it with a direct lease system administered by the Commission
of Lands and benefitting the Central Government rather than the local councils.
The personnel and budgetary controls cited above are examples of formal central
interference in local affairs. Greenwood et al suggest that "formal control is a rela-
tively minor part of much wider, and often informal pressures upon local authorities
to conform to central policy directives." [Greenwood and Howell, p.176]
The Republic of Zambia's stated policy of 'decentralization' was, as indicated
above, to establish participatory democracy and reaffirm local government auton-
omy; but, in practice, the period 1969-1980 clearly established a trend toward the
strengthening of Provincial and District Administration at the expense of local
government. In 1976 still another institution was added to the public institutions
representing Central Government at the sub-national level, this being the State-
appointed Provincial Central Committee which was to oversee the operations of the
District Central Committee.
Thus, the form the policy took in implementation was not one of decentraliza-
tion but rather one of administrative deconcentration of central government to the
District level. In the process of deconcentration, the Government created what has
been described by its own study of decentralized structures "a chaotic constellation
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of organizational activities in which each department and agency in the district
appears to have a separate administrative organization [presenting] a serious prob-
lem of coordination." [Republic of Zambia, 1979, p.39] This problem of coordination
was much exacerbated by the strong central control retained by the President as
the Executive, who exercised his powers in the style of an interventionist autocrat
rather than as a manager.
4.1.3 Integrated Deconcentration Reforms of 1980
This trend toward deconcentration rather than decentralization was formalized in
the 1980s with a third set of comprehensive administrative reforms passed under the
Local Administration Act of 1980. The main goal of the 1980 reforms was to create
"an integrated structure" of Central Government institutional representatives at
the District level in the form of a District Council chaired by the District Governor.
The former urban councils, rural councils, district administration and party were
folded into the District Council which was a major centralizing reform. On the other
hand, the District Governors were given the statutory powers to administer their
functions which represented a delegation of authority that theoretically should have
had a decentralizing effect. As can be seen in Diagram 4.2 below, the integration
was only partial because Central Government Departments and deconcentrated
parastatals were left out.
There was a major loss in local autonomy and an expansion of Central Govern-
ment political control under these reforms as can be seen in the case of the urban
councils. Urban councils not only were absorbed into the larger District Coun-
cils but their elected mayors were replaced by the appointed District Governors
and their councilors were required for the first time to be Party members. The
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Figure 4.2: Structure of Integrated District Administration, Zambia, 1980
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Source: Lungu, Gatian F. 1986, p. 54.
reforms also abolished the professional Local Government Service and placed the
responsibility for all local government appointments with the national PublicSer-
vice Commission. This last reform has probably received the greatest hostility from
local authorities who are now obliged to accept centrally-appointed civil servants
as personnel "most of whom have risen through political consideration rather than
merit." [Lungu, 1980, p.88-89]
In summary, as we reflect over 20+ years of administrative reforms in Zambia, we
see a stated policy of 'decentralization' and expansion of 'participatory democracy'
but a process which in implementation has resulted in the progressive constriction
of local government autonomy and the reduction of elected local representation in
government. If we were to accept district level government as representative of local
interest then the latest series of reforms (1980 Local Administration Act) may in re-
ality be a "mixture of 'centralization' and 'decentralization'." [Conyers, 1986, p.596]
However, the decision to leave parastatals and Central Government departments out
of the integrated District administration dampens the decentralizing effect. First
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of all, it has compromised the potential power of the figure of the District Gover-
nor by giving him authority over one-third of local administration and secondly, it
has perpetuated direct Central Government authority and interference in District
affairs through its parastatals and ministerial departments.
4.2 Morocco: A Francophone Experiment
The Francophone countries of North Africa have developed more quickly than their
Sub-Saharan neighbors and have therefore been forced to acknowledge somewhat
earlier the political, economic and administrative problems presented by their highly
centralized organization of Government. In North Africa, Algeria began the trend
away from uniquely centralist policies in 1967 by establishing a network of rep-
resentative assemblies at the commune level called assemblees populaire commu-
nales. This was followed by the creation of provincial popular assemblies or as-
semblees populaire de wilaya in 1969. These assemblies were merely consultative
and without power but they were the first elected bodies in what had heretofor
been a non-representative, authoritarian regime. In the official rhetoric of the pe-
riod, this was to be the beginning of "[institutional] construction at the base level"
and a process to educate the local populations to the responsibilities of "[partic-
ipatory] management... through their elected representatives." [Boumedienne, p.3]
The Boumedienne regime was the originator in Africa of this conceptual approach
toward decentralization which John Nellis has termed tutorial decentralization. [As
was mentioned earlier, the approach existed earlier for communes under the French
colonial administration but was lost with Independence] The view of the Boume-
dienne regime as interpreted by Nellis was that "the [citizenry] was recently and
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violently torn from its peasant origins and culture and in need of a lengthy and
closely supervised apprenticeship before it can be entrusted with the full range of
powers envisaged by the new system." [Nellis, 1977, p.549]
This developmental model for decentralization of responsibilities and authori-
ties toward local government has subsequently been adopted by other countries in
North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco) and more recently in Francophone West Africa
(Ivory Coast). There are skeptics who see this tutorial decentralization as a po-
litical ploy to secure local support for perpetuating a centralized regime. Local
support is maintained through a process of very gradual transfer of responsibilities
to the local level but always retaining, centrally, powers ofmanagement and review
which can override or dismiss the actions of local government. On the other hand,
it is readily acknowledged throughout Africa, and in many other parts of the world
where countries are contemplating decentralization policy, the inexperience of local
councilors and the lack of professional staff, equipment or sufficient financial re-
sources at the local government level to quickly assume new responsibilities. Under
such conditions, tutorial decentralization is a pragmatic short and medium term
approach to obtain a long-term objective of communal self-sufficiency.
I have chosen to discuss the case of Morocco because this country appears to be
genuinely attempting to pursue a tutorial decentralization strategy as a long-term
developmental process for local government as opposed to using it as what some
have termed a 'political camouflage.' As in all Francophone countries, the commune
is at the center of the reform process to empower local government. The tutorial or
pedagogical orientation to local government reforms was evident in Head of State,
King Hassan II's pronouncement in 1975 on local government reorganization:
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"[the communes]are a school where one learns how to manage a bud-
get, organize actions and execute plans, a school which trains citizens
to be conscious of the true priorities and sensitive to the needs of the
population." [Kingdom of Morocco, p.18]
The King has shown steadfast support for a progressive reform strategy which
would over time "integrate [communes] into the process of planning economic and
social development." [Kingdom of Morocco, p.19] The results since 1975 show more
a preparation for decentralization than decentralization itself. The orientation,
however, is well established which is a great achievement in a country such as
Morocco which has been institutionally centralized for decades.
4.2.1 Historic Centralizing Influences
Historically, Morocco has many reasons contributing to its centralized State which
make the current trend toward decentralization all the more impressive. In pre-
colonial history circa 1500, rural Morocco was nothing more than "a large number
of cohesive kin groups with no political center... [each group] deriving its inner co-
hesion from opposition to a changing exterior threat [from other groups]." [Hess,
p.21] The notion of the State was almost non-existent. Valensi describes the Mo-
rocco of that era as a region where "there was almost no administrative apparatus-
no salaried functionaries and no centralized administration whose employees were
named by the government." [Valensi, p.73] Wolf described it as a government of
"decadence rather than political vigor." [Wolf, p.3] The impotence or absence of a
central government in Morocco (and elsewhere in North Africa) and the existence
instead of an 'uncontrolled' political decentralization have been cited as the major
contributing factors to the initial success of the Arab and Turkish invasions, to the
fall of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa and to the ease of the later French colo-
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nial occupation.[Hess,Brown] I believe, perhaps more than other influences, that
this history of political decentralization with a weak center leading to foreign polit-
ical occupation has biased the current Moroccan regime, paradoxically so, to retain
a strong central government while simultaneously pursuing policies of political and
economic decentralization.
To this history we must add other key centralizing influences which include the
Islamic tradition introduced in the 7th century and the 19th century French colonial
heritage. Islamic philosophy, as described earlier, emphasized the "organic unity"
of social order, legitimizing a style of leadership which institutionalized a central-
ized State authority and power without tolerance for any autonomous base(s) of
power whether they be political, institutional, administrative or social. The Islamic
tradition was overlaid starting in 1912 with the highly-centralist and centralizing
administrative tradition of the French. While the French only officially controlled
the affairs of Morocco through its protectorate status for 40 years (1912-1956), it
was sufficient time to erect "a veritable parallel administration of intervention which
was progressively substituted for the administration of the protected state."[Sibh,
p.13] This should not be surprising when we reflect on the fact that Islam encum-
bered the development of any administrative institutions to cope with the day to
day operations of sub-national government thus creating a vacuum which the French
administration easily and quickly filled.
At Independence in 1956, the Kingdom of Morocco inherited an administrative
system from the French diagrammed below that was more centralized than the
metropole in France. (Refer to page 36 for the French model.)
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Figure 4.3: Structure of Local Government Administration, Morocco, circa 1956
King Government
Provinces
Communes
Urban
Semi-Urban
Rural
In reviewing Diagram 4.3, note that the 'pacha' and 'caid' were traditional
officials of government appointed by the central government and representing central
interests, the 'pacha' administering in the urban and semi-urban municipalities and
the 'caid' in the rural municipalities. Typically these officials managed more than
one municipality.
4.2.2 Minor Reforms during 1956-1975
From 1956 until the major 'decentralization' reforms of 1975, the Moroccan Gov-
ernment undertook three minor reforms which really must be seen as acts of admin-
istrative deconcentration to bring the 'inherited' colonial model of local government
administrations closer to the actual administrative model operating in France. First,
in 1960 the Government took steps to 'elect' representative communal councils at
the commune level; however, their role remained strictly consultative. They had
no economic or administrative powers and so really were little more than token
representative bodies at the local level.
This first reform was followed by another realized in 1963 which created provin-
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cial assemblies under the chairmanship of the 'King'-appointed Governor. They
were comprised of appointed or indirectly-elected representatives from local pro-
fessional organizations and the communal councils and, similar to the coummnal
councils, served in a consultative rather than authoritative capacity. Again this was
a form of administrative deconcentration as they were to advise on provincial (in-
cluding communal) administrative matters of which the most important was their
review of the provincial budget prepared by the Governor. The provincial assem-
blies were given certain powers, including the authority to tax, most of which were
never exercised because of the overriding power of the Governors. In practice, these
assemblies remained weak and their recommendations often ignored by the Gover-
nors who directed their activities. This reform could be seen as a vehicle to provide
the Governor with an administrative-executive body to reinforce, if only symbol-
ically, the importance of his executive authority at the territorial or sub-national
level of government.
Finally, in 1971, the last minor reform created economic regions and introduced
regional consultative assemblies which were to function as purely sub-national ad-
ministrative planning entities with no legislative or executive authority. Their main
function was to propose investment priorities to the national planning administra-
tion. Assembly representatives were determined in the same manner as with the
provincial assemblies, only drawn from all provinces comprising a region. Again,
the importance of the role of the Governor was reinforced as the regional consulta-
tive assemblies had a annual rotating chairmanship from one provincial governor to
the next and the activities of the assembly were guided by the chairman-governor's
secretariat.
As can be seen from Diagram 4.4, these minor reforms served to broaden the
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Figure 4.4: Structure of Local Government Administration, Morocco, circa 1983
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sub-national administrative framework of central government and to reinforce the
authority of the Governor as the main link between central government and local
government. The central government still retained at the center full control over
fiscal authority and policy initiation and indirect control over all subnational gov-
ernmental or administrative activities through the institutional concept of 'tutelle.'
The concept of 'tutelle', as earlier explained, is a French legal-administrative notion
incorporated into the Moroccan system which vests ultimate supervisory and ap-
proval authority over the actions of local government in central government. While
the responsibility for exercising this authority may be delegated to agents of the
central government such as Governors, the authority itself is retained at the center,
most commonly in the Ministry of Interior.
The creation of powerless, pseudo-representative assemblies while strengthening
the administrative roles of the sub-national central government officials, the Gov-
ernors, the pachas and the caids, confirms the fact that this period 1956-1975 in
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Moroccan history really represents one of administrative deconcentration. The re-
forms facilitated the activities of a hierarchic order of agents to carry out the tasks
of central government without giving them ultimate control over fiscal matters or
the authority to undertake policy initiatives.
We can see from Diagram 4.4 the all-powerful role of the provincial governors
which exists to the present. The Governors are appointed by the King to represent
the central government in the provinces. Their role is threefold: 1) to coordinate the
activities of central ministry delegations to the provinces; 2) to maintain law and
order; 3) to oversee the administrative, financial, and political affairs of the local
governments, both rural and urban. As indicated above, the Governor also chairs
the provincial assembly and on a rotating basis, the regional assembly. The Gover-
nor serves as the chairman of the board of all provincial regies which are local utility
agencies to supply water, electricity or transport. More importantly, the Governor
under the concept of 'tutelle' has been designated by Central Government with full
oversight responsibility for the activities of the mayor and municipal council and
can alter their actions or withdraw their authorities. Of particular consequence is
the Governor's approval authority over commune budgets. While the municipalities
prepare and ratify their own budgets, the Governor closely supervises the process
to the point of imposing funding priorities within the budget as well as mandating
the total budget amount.
The pachas and caids, pre-1975, functioned as delegates of authority for the
governor, assuming supervisory responsibilities over the activities of the municipal-
ities on behalf of the governor. Though their authorities post-1975 reform have
been legally restricted to maintaining a broad range of law and order activities,
operationally:
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"most resolutions of the municipal councils do not take effect until
the Governor either directly or through the pacha has exercised oversight
responsibilities. The pacha has authority to step in and assume the
responsibilities of the President of the Municipal Council if the latter
fails or refuses to carry them out." [Madhusudhan, p.5]
The extensive and on-going interference of the pachas and caids in the affairs of
communes has caused considerable confusion and conflict at the local level over the
real division of functional responsibilities between the local government and central
government institutions.
4.2.3 Decentralization Reforms of 1975
The advent of the 'decentralization' reforms in 1975, did not measureably change
the structure of power and administration in government. The importance of the
reforms was more in the official announcment of a reorientation of emphasis from
a centralist to decentralist objective. They signalled a commitment, both legally
and politically, toward gradual 'empowerment' of communes, defined earlier as legal
devolution or legal decentralization. Secondly, they further strengthened the admin-
istrative powers of the Governors and subsequently granted partial fiscal powers to
the provinces as sub-national administrative units of government. This second or-
der of reforms at the provincial level, though receiving less attention, marks in my
view the beginning of a shift from administrative deconcentration to administra-
tive decentralization as evidenced by an actual transfer or sharing of fiscal power.
This double-reform approach of legal decentralization to the communes and ad-
ministrative decentralization to the provinces is exemplary of the hybrid forms of
decentralization discussed in chapter 3. In the Moroccan case, however, such re-
forms are being tested in a protected or controlled environment. The institution of
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tutelage remains lodged at the center, affording central government ultimate over-
sight authority over all sub-national administrative and local government activities;
and, the approach is 'tutorial' and therefore also controlled by the center which
decides when its students are ready to assume more responsibility and control over
their own affairs.
Authors have speculated on any number of reasons b ehind this apparent attitu-
dinal shift from a uniquely centralist system to a decentralizing one. The standard
arguments are administrative and economic. The administrative argument was
succinctly stated in the draft Social and Economic Development Plan for 1981-85:
"Most government departments have retained a centralised func-
tional organization. The defects of this system are: slowness of ad-
ministrative management, great distances between decision centers and
information sources, congestion of central services, and an irrational
utilisation of human resources." [Royaume de Maroc, 1981, Vol II,p.291]
"The functions of these services must be redefined in order to permit
them to play fully the role which is assigned to them in the processes of
decentralization and deconcentration."[Royaume de Maroc, 1981, Vol I
p.73]
The economic argument in Morocco as elsewhere has been that excessively central-
ized control of decision-making and resources for development, particularly during
periods of economic boom, has had a dampening affect on growth and has resulted
in widening disparities among regions and classes of people with respect to services
and income levels.
Nellis argues that the case of Morocco was basically political but tied to the
administrative and economic arguments stated above because of the 'political dis-
content' generated by the conditions they represent. The political argument for
Morocco, according to Nellis, was "to decentralize as part of a longer-run effort
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aimed at weakening the effects of divisive factors" which would include both eco-
nomic factors and the frustrations of local officials and populations heretofor power-
less to improve local conditions.[Nellis, 1983, p.486] One divisive factor cited, which
may have, historically, been significant in the decision to launch a decentralization
reform was the struggle to incorporate or reincorporate the Western Sahara into
Morocco. The promise of decentralization was possibly a political move to make
the re-incorporation more palatable to the Western Saharans. However, the actions
taken by the Moroccan Government since 1975 suggest a process which represents
a much broader, more long-term commitment to the principles of decentralization
than a historic regional struggle, albeit an expensive one, off of one border.
As indicated above, there were two prongs to the 1975 decentralization reforms,
reform at the provincial level and reform at the commune level. At the provincial
level, the Government set forth a program of reform proposing to improve coor-
dination among the localized central government services by simplifying control
processes, to improve qualitatively and quantitatively the personnel resources in
Government field offices by increasing promotion possibilities from rural posts as
well as salary and benefits, and to clarify the supervisory responsibilities of cen-
tral government bodies at the provincial level. While these reforms were aimed at
improving administrative efficiency, they have been slow in their realization both
because of insufficient resources and "a reticence of a certain number of central ser-
vices to cede prerogatives (implementation, launching of actions, recruitment and
management of personnel) to their field units judged still too inexperienced and
insufficiently endowed in human and physical means." [Royaume de Maroc, 1981,
p.73) Other subsequent reforms show a trend toward establishing a power-sharing
relationship between central government and provincial government. The principle
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example was the decision by Government in 1977 to make the provincial governors
co-managers with the Ministry of Interior of the expenditures of the provinces and
the communes, hence their budget approval authority earlier mentioned. They were
also granted authority to take over control from central government of the supply
credits of local offices of central ministries located in the provinces.
Far more significant in the longer run is the experiment underway at the com-
mune level, launched by the 1975 reform. In 1975, King Hassan II promised "to
enlarge to the maximum the attributions and responsibilities of elected represen-
tatives and to accord to them in the future the means, giving them the power, to
control local efforts." [Baldous, p.282] As an act of good faith, within a year the
King had issued a series of royal decrees setting forth the new organization, attri-
butions and budget procedures for communes under the decentralization reforms.
These decrees were published in 1976 in the form of official legal texts [essential
to permit administrative action in the French or French-influenced systems of gov-
ernment] under the title Communal Organization: Organization of the Finances
of Local Governments.[Royaume De Maroc, 1976] While the commitment to decen-
tralization is evidenced by these texts, they carefully preserve and integrate the
'tutelle' authority of central government. The issuance of these texts was followed
in the same year by the country's first nation-wide competitive elections to elect
the representatives of the newly constitituted representative municipal councils in
both rural and urban communes.
As with the reforms at the provincial level, these at the commune level have ex-
perienced even slower implementation because of the more serious lack of personnel,
equipment, resources and experience at the commune level. But then the intention
of the reforms was to structure a tutorial decentralization which, by definition, is
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expected to be a long-term process. For this reason, it is more important at this
early stage in the Moroccan experience to focus on the development of the tools of
the tutorial process than to measure the degree of decentralization achieved. The
efforts by the Kingdom of Morocco to structure the tutorial process, as discussed
below, have been concentrated in the two most critical areas, local finances and
personnel and training.
Tools For Reform in the Area of Finance In the area of local government fi-
nance, two important steps have been taken by the Kingdom of Morocco to increase
local government financial powers and resources, the legitimization of local finan-
cial administrations and the increased commitment of resources to local government.
First, the issuance by Government of the enabling texts legally established the fi-
nancial management powers of the elected municipal councils subject to 'tutelle'
oversight of the State. They detailed, for the first time officially, a financial operat-
ing structure for communes which would permit development toward autonomous
or quasi-autonomous financial operations. The reforms also called for a reform
of the revenue-raising mechanisms available to local government so as to expand
own-source revenues. There has been little progress on this latter objective though
national tax reforms are under discussion and the problems of limited personnel,
equipment and experience at the local level have made the achievement of any mea-
sure of real local financial autonomy unattainable in the short-run. However, ig-
noring the slow implementation process, the reorientation toward local government
signaled by the 1975 reforms did heighten official recognition of the deficiencies in
existing local government financial administration which has spurred efforts to in-
corporate these elements into supplemental reforms to aid the development of local
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government institutions.
The second sign by the Kingdom of Morocco of a serious commitment to local
government reforms has been the substantial increase in the level of central gov-
ernment resources committed to capital investment at the local government level
despite national resource constraints imposed by the Western Sahara conflict and
a flagging world economy. In 1976, as part of the decentralization reforms, the
Government created the Local Government Development Fund(FDCLG) with an
initial pledge of DH 1.1 million realized in tranches of DH 100 million in 1977, DH
400 million in 1979 and DH 600 million in 1980.[Madhusudhan, p.10][Nellis, 1983,
p.168] This fund constitutes today the main source of central government subsi-
dies for local government capital expenditures. In keeping with the parallel gov-
erning structure (provinces-pachas/caids) established under the system of tutelle
(described above), allocation authority over these resources was entrusted to the
Governors of the provinces. A second major central fund, the Communal Infras-
tructure Fund (FEC), created in 1959 to provide loans to local government for
infrastructure and development projects, has expanded its lending volume from
DH 33 million in 1977 to DH 250 million in 1985, with growth projected to DH
400 million by 1990.[Madhusudhan, p.11] Until 1978, most of its loans went to the
wealthiest urban communes in the Center and Northwest regions of the country. To
try to reverse this skewing of resource allocations, the Government set up a special
mobile project unit in 1977 to aid smaller urban and rural communes, handicapped
by shortage of technical staff, prepare project proposal submissions to the FEC.
This was an important tutorial gesture toward achieving greater equity in resource
allocations and providing technical support to local government until they could do
for themselves. One would have to study the allocation patterns to determine if
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this has had any real effect. Again, the Governors play a key role in the communes
choice of projects for FEC loan requests and in the allocation of FEC loans. Finally,
with respect to communal operating budgets, World Bank data, quoted by Nellis
for the period 1977 to 1979, showed an increase of 170 percent in the level of direct
transfers to local government to fund operating and recurrent costs.[Nellis, 1983,
p.168] The source of these increases was most likely the 4-8 percent of proceeds
from the center-collected sales tax on goods and services, the business registra-
tion fee or patente transferred yearly to municipalities, and the annual balancing
subsidies provided to cover operating deficits.
There remains a sharp distinction between powers of financial management over
funds received from above and powers of actual assessment, collection and alloca-
tion of key municipal revenue sources. At present, communes have total control on
average of only 15 percent or less of their total revenues, this portion being the funds
collected under local taxes and fees such a market stall rents, slaughterhouse fees
and forest and mineral reserve leasing fees. This percentage for individual cities is
often much less as evidenced by the 1980-1984 revenue figures for local taxes and fees
in Marrakech (10%), Tangiers (6%), Sale (4%) and Ouzda (11%).[Madhusudhan,
p.9] True decentralization requires that the powers to assess, collect and/or allocate,
currently held at the center or provincial level, also be transferred to local govern-
ment. Under Morocco's tutorial decentralization, the resources available to local
government have been increased as indicated above; but, as indicated in Table 4.1,
the sources of revenue for both operating and capital expenditures remain largely
at the center with the allocation controls at the provincial level. Furthermore, while
the resources from central and provincial government are increasing, there is an in-
dication of an offsetting decrease in the proportional share of own-source revenues
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Table 1: Source of Local Government Revenues in Morocco, 1980-1982
(Percent Distribution)
1980 1981 1982
Central Government Control
1. Central Government administered taxes 39.5 42.9 40.6
2. Subsidies and Transfers 40.1 41.1 44.9
Local Government Control
3. Local Taxes and Fees 20.4 16.5 15.5
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Madhusudhan, R. Review of Municipal Finance
tries in the Ea. Med-North Africa Region, Unpublished Data,
p. 6
in Selected Coun-
World Bank 1985,
raised by local governments themselves.
The reason given for the continuation of extensive financial controls from above
is the inadequate system of collection and management at the local level to ad-
minister either center-generated or commune-generated resources. Also, except for
the largest urban communes, communes have, in general, very limited local tax
bases, making financial self-sufficiency an unrealistic goal or alternatively making
a degree of dependency on central government resources a necessary component of
local government financing. The expressed intent of the Moroccan Government is
to retain financial controls on behalf of local government until the local units are
appropriately structured and staffed to assume a greater degree of financial respon-
sibility. A national tax reform currently under discussion, should clearly indicate
whether there is a real commitment to truly decentralize financial powers to the
communes through a restructuring of existing taxing mechanisms to permit greater
local taxing authority and a higher degree of direct transfer of funds from central to
local government rather than perpetuating the layer of financial controls through
the parallel government structure.
94
Tools For Reform in the Area of Personnel and Training Personnel and
training must be considered as a key area in decentralization policy analysis be-
cause poor staffing and management practices are often given as a major excuse
for withholding responsibility and power from local government. The problems
of locally-assigned civil servants and locally-elected representatives in Moroccan
communes are echoed in most countries undergoing decentralization reforms in the
context of traditionally highly centralized systems of government.
Many of the 849 communes in Morocco are operating with a skeleton staff. Few
of the key department positions are filled with competent people and many other
supervisory and management postions are left vacant. This severely overburdens
the senior and mid-level staff in place and often means placing line employees in
supervisory positions for which they have no previous experience or qualifications.
Vacancies are due in part to the provincial location of many municipalities when
most qualified workers prefer the largest cities. More importantly, the wages for
municipal workers are considerably below public employees for central government.
Some communes are even using common day laborer rates for their administrative
employees.
Generally, there is an absence of a clearly stated personnel policy (job descrip-
tions and qualifications, salary scales, promotion ladder, hiring guidelines) to guide
and motivate employees in their careers. Absence of procedures for hiring has led to
each commune operating on an ad hoc basis which leaves much room for doling out
positions to relatives and friends, many of whom are unskilled. Staff at all levels
are often operating in jobs which require a higher level or different type of skills
training than they have had. Many lower level staff, particularly in the smaller
communes, have extremely low educational and skills levels and a fair number are
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illiterate.
Newly-elected municipal councils are frequently disfunctional due to lack of role
definition, absence of any job orientation and the fact that there is no compensation
for their work, instilling little incentive to do much. Even conscientious councilors
can not necessarily afford the uncompensated time and the cost of transport to
participate fully. In one commune in the region of Kenitra, the absentiism has been
so bad that the president of the council has had to be legally convoqued from time to
time to carry out his obligations under the law. As elected representatives of local
populations, councilors are often traditonal ethnic leaders who may be illiterate
and are, for the most part, ignorant of most of the management tasks of local
government and its relationships and responsiblities visavis central government. The
limited sociological statistics of the 1976 municipal elections in Morocco showed 42
percent of the elected councilors to be illiterate, 40 percent to have only a primary
level education and 17 percent to have attained a secondary school or high school
diploma. [Baldous, p.300] With such conditions existing at the local level, the tutorial
approach to decentralization would seem to be the only possible way to ease local
units into the responsibilities of self-governance.
In the Morocco case, the Government has undertaken two significant initiatives
to begin to build a professional corp at the local government level. First, in 1977,
the Government created a local civil service corp to specially train civil servants for
posts in local government. The corp's primary goal is to train, pay for and assign
a secretary general to every commune to act as a chief administrative assistant to
the council and council president. Secondly, the corps is forming other lower level
technicians for service in local government systems. There is a problem with the
secretary generals being poorly received by localities who perceive them as spies
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of the central government who may collaborate more easily with the officials of
the pachas and caids than with their own municipal councils. Nonetheless, this is
the beginning of a professional staff at the local level, albeit centrally-trained and
salaried.
A second action on the part of the Government to strengthen the personnel
structure of local governments was the decision in 1981 to establish a Directorate of
Training in the Ministry of Interior. This directorate known as the Direction de la
Formation des Cadres is charged with the responsibility of identifying and address-
ing local government staff training and information needs including the needs of
elected municipal councilors and officials. Previously training had been undertaken
by a low level service of the Ministry which had graduated less than 2400 staff in
12 years of operation. Within a year, the new directorate had organized under its
tutellage thirteen training centers with over 2300 students enrolled, a twelve-fold
increase over the previous system.[Nellis, 1983, p.496 In keeping with the decen-
tralization program goals, this Directorate has launched an important permanent
series of on-the-job seminars to train and inform councilors and executive committee
members of the duties, procedures, and rights of their elected offices.
I have labored over the Moroccan case because its tutorial approach to decen-
tralization is being closely watched and imitated by other Third World countries
struggling with similar challenges of decentralizing administrative and governing
responsibilities to local governments. In Morocco as elsewhere highly ambitious
and idealistic decentralization reforms have preceeded the mechanics of their imple-
mentation. In most cases, the responsibilities and powers implied by the reforms
are way beyond the current level of institutional development and capacity in local
government. The tutorial approach seeks to establish first an institutional base be-
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fore making any substantial transfer of responsibilities and power. In structuring
the tutorial approach to decentralization, the Moroccan Government has succeeded
in substantially expanding central controls at the sub-national level through its re-
inforcement of the role and authority of the Governors and their territories, the
provinces. This move has afforded a deconcentration of central government re-
sponsibilties while providing a closer level of supervision and administrative and
technical support to the fledgling administrations of local communes. At the same
time, Government has also retained ultimate approval authority, the privilege of
the 'tutelle' at the center. Thus, there has really been no serious transfer of power
as yet to the local governments.
The true test of Morocco's commitment to decentralization will be its willingness
to seriously begin the transfer of power and in particular financial authority to local
government units. The nation's decentralization reforms, at present, preserve the
centralizing concept of 'tutelle.' In the long term, to achieve a successful degree of
decentralization toward local government, this vestigal, french-inspired system of
supervisory control and approval will have to be partially or totally dismantled to
permit local decision-making and the authority to act on those decisions. Such a
move would represent a major compromise of the political p ower of the center which
the Kingdom of Morocco, steeped as it is in centralist tradition, may ultimately be
unwilling to undertake.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The major intentions of this thesis have been to underscore the political complexities
of decentralization in theory and in practice in the Third World; to give justification
for slow implementation progress; and to offer some observations on the dynamics
of the process as guidance for those who would promote decentralization as a solu-
tion to development with efficiency. In these conclusions, therefore, I will take the
opportunity to highlight some of the more salient points made in the thesis.
5.1 Historic Cultural Influences
Within any given country, both the policy and implementation of decentralization
are largely shaped by local historic-cultural precedent, the prevalent societal val-
ues and expectations, and political personalities dominating a society at any given
period of time. Among the historic-cultural influences discussed in the thesis, I
believe the colonial history of Third World countries has had the most significant
negative impact on their ability to develop modern forms of local government. This
is primarily because the experience destroyed the traditional institutional base on
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which modern government would likely have been formed.
There have been many authors who have praised the colonial experience in Africa
as the source of enlightenment for backward regimes, bringing to them the more
sophisticated Western ideas and institutions. It is my view that the colonial expe-
rience is largely responsible for stunting the growth of legitimate local government.
First of all, the colonial policy of centralized administration destroyed (French)
or compromised (British) indigenous governing institutions and either displaced or
co-opted the traditional leadership to represent the interests of the abstract State
rather than their people. Because the ultimate goal of both British and French sys-
tems was to maintain control over disparate populations, loyalty to the State from
various indigenous officers in the civil service systems and [in the British case], the
native authorities, was more highly valued than competence. Appointed, indige-
nous local officials were more likely selected on the basis of the former than the
latter characteristic. This trend of elevating loyalty above competency has contin-
ued on into current administrations where it is commonplace for officials caught up
in scandal to reappear in another part of government after a period of time with
no apparent damage to their careers. The ultimate consequence of these colonial
practices was the loss of legitimacy by local institutions and leadership in the eyes
of local populations.
A second consequence of colonial rule, was the rupture of the highly-personal-
ized system of accountability between ruler and the ruled tied to a centuries old
traditional value structure. This was replaced by the foreign, impersonal notion of
the State where the cumbersome bureacracy and 'glass house' politics of imposing
sanctions on officers for improper conduct or poor performance discouraged their
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effective1 application. This led to entrenched incompetency and untold graft and
corruption which has generally biased attitudes at both local and central levels
against local government officials. Conditions of corruption were so bad in Zambia
as to serve as an excuse for central government to dismantle the local government
civil service.
A third consequence which I attribute to the colonial metamorphosis was the
imposition by the State of its role as paternalistic provider, ostensibly to win the
allegiance of farflung, often ethnically-divided peoples. In the long run, this orienta-
tion has created a dependent, apathetic public unwilling to take local development
initiative or pay for benefits when they expect all to be provided gratuitously by the
State. This was particularly true of the French system of colonial administration.
Mention was made of the financial dependency of the Territories(former colonies)
on the Federation while neglecting their internal revenue and budget management.
This mentality has been carried on into post-Independence national regimes and is
most evident in trends of escalating intergovernmental transfers and shrinking local
government revenue contributions.
Finally, the colonial model of government, whether British or French, estab-
lished a highly centralized and bureaucratic system of administration suited more
for control than development. This model prevented the development of strong local
government during the colonial era and, post-Independence governments, controlled
by Western educated elite [except in Algeria], reinforced this form, convinced of its
utility to meeting their first priority of securing national unity. Taken collectively,
these consequences of colonial rule provided a very unstable base from which to
'Saying: "People who live in glass houses should not throw stones." Corruption has been evident
at all levels of government so that accusers may be as guilty as the accused and therefore reluctant
to carry out sanctions.
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generate a vital local government system. As a result, local government has re-
mained the weakest link in most governments, understaffed, underfunded and, until
the recent decentralization emphasis, largely ignored.
5.2 Decentralization As A Dynamic Process
The problems of achieving national-level development and the threatening poli-
tics of dissension in underdeveloped regions have forced many governments to con-
sider changes to their center control-oriented administrative systems, changes which
would encourage or facilitate regional and local development. Morocco launched
into its major decentralization reforms in 1975 in part to win support from popula-
tions of the contested least-developed region of the West Sahara (South). Senegal
reinforced its decentralization policy and programs in 1984 to diffuse separatist
tensions in the least-developed region of the Casamance. Kenya, concerned by the
failure of local development programs under center-headquartered sectoral devel-
opment ministries, launched its 'district-focus for rural development' program in
1984. These reforms have been commonly grouped under the umbrella of 'decen-
tralization.' They are indicative of a process of reform in each country which has
been experimental and on-going and is therefore in a constant state of transition.
Series of reforms and re-reforms in many countries have pushed different com-
ponents of their administrative systems back and forth along the decentralization-
centralization continuum so that what has been emerging are numerous hybrid con-
structs of decentralization-centralization, designed to achieve development without
compromising to too great an extent central control. In many cases, the reforms
have been purely administrative restructuring among center-controlled sub-national
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units and public agencies, though experimentation seems to be going increasingly
in the direction of some measure of power transfer.
I believe the reason for these hybrid forms on the side of centralization is two-
fold. First of all, historically-centralized governments that have achieved national
unity and identity across typically vast geographic space settled by numerous dif-
ferent ethnic groups fear that too great a compromise of their central control may
lead to internal political divisions or encourage infiltration by outside foreign in-
terests. Secondly, many countries have very weak local government systems with
little institutional base to which they can transfer responsibilities with confidence
and so may seek an intermediate or interim solution of reinforcing provincial or
district level government to supervise the activities of local government. On the
decentralization side, it is claimed that greater local control of official represen-
tation through universal suffrage, of financial and administrative decision-making
and of taxing and fee mechanisms to generate more resources locally is necessary to
stimulate responsible performance by local officials, held politically accountable to
local populations, and to generate enthusiasm among local populations to partici-
pate in development activities in which they have a voice. Furthermore, in a period
of shrinking national resources, a growing number of central and local government
representatives believe that more resources could be generated locally if localities
had control of their generation rather than collecting on behalf of central govern-
ment and depending on the tax rebate for their major source of revenues. These
reasons and other arguments on either side of the centralization-decentralization
debate keep the form of 'decentralization' in flux. The biases of important political
personalities, particularly the heads of state, and of international donors on which
countries may depend for significant percentages of their development budgets have
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enormous influence over the direction of the reform movements.
5.3 Donor Shortsightedness and Biases
Until recently, international donors have been more a handicap than an aid to the
development of local government. Holding the purse strings for development re-
sources, donors have an enormous amount of influence over Third World policy
and development programs and as such, countries and their local government sys-
tems have been victims of donor omissions and biases. I want to cite three areas
of concern where donor behavior has had or could have negative impacts on local
government development.
In the 1960's and 1970's, donors, working closely with central governments,
enthusiastically financed large-scale capital investments (i.i. water and transport
systems) in the large and medium-size cities of Third World contries. National
development agencies or parastatals were formed to execute the projects and carry
them into start-up operations. The major problem was that little consideration was
given to the abilities of recipient municipalities to assume the technical and finan-
cial responsibilities for operating, maintaining and debt-servicing these investments,
themselves often inappropriate for want of local input in their planning. Alarm-
ing increases in local government financial or resource gaps (difference between
internally-generated revenue receipts and revenue expenditures) have been gener-
ated in large part by such investments whose recurrent costs were either not planned
for or whose revenue-generation or cost recovery potential was overestimated. Poor
estimating may have been part of the politics of gaining project approval at the
donor funding source. A good example of this shortsightedness in investment plan-
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ning for the local level is the impact of World Bank-financed urban development
projects in Calcutta, India. The estimated resource gap in 1981-82 for the Calcutta
Metropolitan Area (CMA) was Rs 330 million, equivalent to 53 percent of the total
CMA revenue expenditures. Approximately 48 percent of the gap, or Rs 160 mil-
lion, was attributed to the World Bank-financed investment area within the CMA
with a estimated Rs 120 million representing operating and maintenance cost for the
investments.[Menezes, p.68 As the example points out, with most large-scale urban
investments coming from sources external to the municipality and frequently from
foreign donors, the local government has often become a 'project-taker' without
a significant voice in the project decision-making or design process. The negative
consequences for local government of the centralized-investment decision-making
promoted by the donors have been the loss of development benefits through inap-
propriately maintained investments and the creation of a financial handicap through
unplanned additions to debt service and operating expenditures.
As was indicated earlier, donors, biased by such models as the welfare state
or 'Great Society' in the U.S. and nationalized public services in England, urged
Third World governments to create in the 1960's and 1970's both national and sub-
national public agencies to manage development activities and delivery of services
in an institutional framework freed from the congestion of central government bu-
reaucracy and closer to the intended beneficiaries. In many cases, donors helped
create these agencies, both financially and technically. The Intergovernmental Fi-
nance Commission in Colombia which was headed by Bird in 1978 registered 129
such agencies in the larger cities, excluding central ministries and administrative
departments.[Bird, p.50] Local government authorities, particularly the larger mu-
nicipalities, lost responsibilities for delivery of local public services to decentralized
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national public enterprises. These agencies effectively placed under central control
in a decentralized framework almost all local public sector expenditures for major
public services and investment in a manner which was overlapping and confusing
in terms of areas of responsibility and which incorporated little effort to coordinate
with local authorities. While the scores of public agencies may have represented
progress for national institution-building, a major objective of the donor commu-
nity, there was a negative impact on local government institution-building because
reasons justifying the development of local capacity had been negated by the ex-
pansionary role of national public agency players.
There is a strong possibility that the new donor thrust toward privatization of
public sector activities may have some similar negative consequences for local gov-
ernment unless it is moderated to take into consideration the institutional develop-
ment needs of local government to function effectively in public-private partnerships
for delivery of public goods and services. At present, many local governments have a
poor understanding of what it means to be fiscally and administratively responsible
for their own affairs since there has been so much interference by central government
or its agents. Local governments need to be given the opportunity to develop a sense
of what it takes to manage their own affairs before they can effectively delegate these
responsibilities to private entities functioning on their behalf. Because local govern-
ment institutions are so weak, there is a danger that public sector divestiture will
turn into private sector contracting to provincial or district government for delivery
of services, again with no local government input or responsibility. This private
sector linkage to central government entities would perpetuate the backwardness of
local government administrations in much the same way as the public agency era
has.
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Finally, donors have a tendency to popularize among each other development
concepts such as 'appropriate technology' or 'women in development' or 'small-scale
enterprise development', to develop a program approach or model from each concept
and to try to make all countries conform to this model in exchange for development
resources. A similar trend is occurring with the more recent introduction into the
donor program terminology of the concepts of decentralization and privatization.
The problem this presents is the fact that decentralization in interpretation and form
differs from one country environment to the next, based largely on local political
factors and the historic-cultural context in which it is developing. Efforts by donors
to force a 'fixed' approach to decentralization onto developing countries may result
in the waste of valuable resources on politically and culturally unacceptable actions
to achieve decentralization. Not only are global models for decentralization likely to
be largely biased by the donors' own national experiences but they can encourage
recipient countries to falsify policy intent in order to obtain resources essential to
development. Because decentralization is an experimental and dynamic process in
most Third World countries, donor assistance programs must remain flexible to be
able to respond with sensitivity and speed to shifting development priorities within
the local environment in support of this process.
5.4 Transfer of Power
In the interpretation of many, decentralization is only real when there has been a
transfer of political control, decision-making power and financial authority to the
local level. However, in the instances where local governments have been elected by
universal suffrage and given the legal authorities of decision-making and financial
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control, it has been observed that the full extent of these powers are not exercised
because of the weaknesses of local administrative capacity and the substantial on-
going support of central government, financially or administratively, which enables
local authorities to defer assumption of their new responsibilities.
Representative government at the local level is only useful if elected represen-
tatives can function effectively in their official positions. In the colonial era, where
limited (appointed) representative government existed, representatives were often
bought or intimidated into positions of agreement with central government. While
there has been a movement toward 'popularly-elected' local governments under de-
centralization reforms in various countries, the councilors elected often have no
educational background or experience to prepare them for the responsibilities of
their positions. They are frequently ignorant of the administrative systems of local
government and not clear on their mandate from the people or the role expected
of them from the Government. Furthermore, the electorate itself is unfamiliar with
what to expect of elected government and in many cases may revert back to direct
appeals to central government authorities on issues of concern, circumventing their
elected representatives. Some of these problems will change as local government
administrations and the electorate become more used to the process of electing and
working with an elected council and mayor. However, a repeated cycle of admin-
istrative assistance tied to the electoral term is needed to inform the electorate
and to provide orientation and limited training to new councilors concerning the
responsibilities of elected office in local government.
Exercising the decision-making authority vested in local government has also run
into problems which, I believe, result from on-going interference in local affairs by
central agencies or other sub-national units of government and ingrained attitudes
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in local officials which inhibit their decision-making ability. This latter problem has
cultural roots in hierarchal systems of government which never permitted decision-
making to be taken at the local level. The role of local officals was always to act
for higher level authorities and the role of the people was strictly passive, to be
the voiceless objects of central government decision-making, good or bad. A whole
learning process is needed at the local level to gain the confidence necessary to
exercise decision-making authority responsibly and independently.
Governments, anxious to reinforce local government, are hastily shifting increas-
ing amounts of resources to the local level rather than working out the more painful
financial reforms which would vest a broader range of revenue-raising mechanisms
and allocation authority in local government. Studies of the effects of rising in-
tergovernmental transfers from central to local government in support of decen-
tralization policy have shown not only a substitution effect of transfer funds for
own-source revenues but also an actual deterioration of own-source contributions to
operating budgets. So, in effect, an effort to assist local government development
through budget support vehicles of government transfers and subsidies may have
the effect of actually causing a deterioration in existing local systems and an in-
crease in dependency levels because it makes no demands for financially responsible
performance by local government.
* *
In conclusion, governments in the Third World which have launched into decen-
tralization programs are struggling to maintain a delicate balance between control
and development. They want to devolve the responsibilities and mechanisms of
political, financial and administrative management enough to stimulate local au-
thorities to assume much of the responsibilities for their own operation and devel-
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opment; yet, they do not want to create independent entities which might eventually
challenge the government's ultimate control of the political affairs and development
resources of the nation.
The balance is tipped back towards centralization by unresolved questions of
achieving some form of development equity among unequally-endowed regions and
by the need to develop the institutional base at the local level to permit it to
accept the responsibilities for running its own affairs. The tutorial approach to
decentralization discussed at length in the Morocco case holds considerable promise
for local government development. It is a gradual program of technical assistance
and training to local government to prepare them to assume the responsibilities
of power transfer and offers the flexibility of introducing increasing decentraliza-
tion as local governments are prepared to accept the responsibility. This process of
local institutional development is long term and must be recognized as such by out-
siders seeking to offer advice or assistance. The sincerity, however, of governments
pursuing a 'tutorial' decentralization process will be judged by their willingness to
take some risks with local government to permit them increasing opportunities of
learning by doing within a constructive and instructive system of accountability to
central government.
It is not apparent that the popular promotion in classical decentralization the-
ory toward total local government autonomy or self-reliance is either workable or
desireable in the Third World; yet some change is necessary to stimulate a sharing
of the development responsibilities now weighting down central government. Bird
wrote in his treatise on intergovernmental finance in Colombia that "only when each
level of government is responsible for raising its own expenditures is a concern for
the effiency and the effectiveness of public spending likely to be paramount in the
110
minds of those who make public decisions." [Bird, p.55] Given the overwhelmingly
centralized style of government in the Third World yet the practical problems of
raising and using limited resources efficiently, the future for the decentralization
process seems to promise a gradual movement toward making the various levels
of government more individually responsible for their own resource generation and
development but still within a supervisory framework tied to the center. This tran-
sition will ultimately necessitate a greater focus on strengthening the weakest link
in the system, local government.
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Table 1: Source of Local Government Revenues in Morocco, 1980-1982
(Percent Distribution)
1980 1981 1982
Central Government Control
1. Central Government administered taxes
2. Subsidies and Transfers
Local Government Control
3. Local Taxes and Fees
39.5 42.9 40.6
40.1 41.1 44.9
20.4 16.5 15.5
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Madhusudhan, R. Review of Municipal Finance in Selected Coun-
tries in the Ea. Med-North Africa Region, Unpublished Data, World Bank 1985,
p. 6
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